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ABSTRACT
The mainstay of Japan's domestic and foreign policy
successes after the Occupation has been its economic prowess.
The reforms implemented throughout the Occupation, combined
with the strong Japanese concepts of loyalty and willingness
to work, proved successful ingredients for a healthy economic
recovery. Many restrictive policies and protectionist
practices were implemented in an effort to ensure the
survivability of Japan's newly restructured industrial base.
The end of the Cold War and emergence of a new emphasis on
economic-related factors has resulted in strong criticisms
from both the United States and Japan and is causing them to
reevaluate the nature of their relationship. This thesis
examines the role of trade and technology in U.S. -Japan
relations in the post-Cold War era. If trade/ technology-
related tensions continue to grow, they may become detrimental
to the mutually favorable relationship. The danger is that
they will undermine the U.S. -Japan relationship. The challenge
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War has brought to an end at least
forty years of fear that the Soviet Union and Communism posed
throughout the world. These fears, however, are being
replaced in the United States by the economic Challenge posed
by foreign competitors, and in particular, Japan. This is
being fueled by many factors, including the ongoing lopsided
trade deficit between the United States and Japan, Japanese
purchases of U.S. corporations and the drain of U.S.
technology to Japan. Anti-Japanese opinion is on the rise and
is, in turn, provoking an anti-American backlash in Japan.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of trade
and technology in U.S-Japan relations in the post-Cold War
era. It is my hypothesis that if trade/ technology-related
tensions continue to grow, they may become detrimental to the
mutually favorable relationship. This thesis will attempt to
show that criticisms on both sides of the Pacific are
continually intensifying to the degree that the U.S. -Japan
relationship could be jeopardized.
The post-Cold War era has obviated the need for a security
relationship based on the Soviet threat. However, due to
regional animosities between Japan and its neighbors from
memories of Imperial Japan, and for purposes of maintaining
regional stability, it is important that a cooperative
relationship between the United States and Japan continue.
vi
As Japan has attained its super economic status, the U.S.
has had difficulty penetrating Japanese markets, creating
tensions and exacerbating the U.S. trade deficit. With the
emphasis on the economy in the 1992 U.S. presidential election
campaign, and the incoming Clinton administration, it can be
expected that trade issues will be high on the agenda. Given
the degree to which nations are becoming more economically
interdependent, it is essential that the United States and
Japan solve the existing trade problems, hopefully without
breeding feelings of antagonism or bitterness.
The development and commercialization of new technologies
is becoming an issue of major concern within the United
States. Japanese acquisition and control of U. S . -developed
technologies could pose a serious threat to U.S. national
security. Cutbacks in the defense budget have reduced U.S.
military R&D. The military must increasingly rely on the
commercial sector, and consequently, foreign suppliers, to
provide its state-of-the-art equipment. Some vital U.S.
industries such as electronics and semiconductors are yielding
to Japanese competition. Moreover, the ability of Japan to
obtain and exploit this technology exacerbates the ongoing
trade deficit, resulting in the loss of millions of jobs for
U.S. employees and fueling anti-Japanese sentiment in the
United States.
To fully conduct an objective analysis requires an
understanding of the Japanese perspective. In this regard,
vii
whether or not American allegations are accurate is beside the
point. The important point that must be considered, and
treated carefully, is the perceptions of the Japanese
regarding these issues. Many Japanese feel the U.S. trade and
technology problems are due to the inability of the United
States to get its own house in order and adjust to changing
economic conditions. It is only through a clear understanding
of the factors that have molded the Japanese mindset
throughout their history that we can fully comprehend the
current Japanese attitudes and perceptions. Through this
understanding we can set the foundation to effectively work
with Japan in an aura of friendliness and cooperation in
seeking to resolve the current trade/technology tensions.
It is imperative that both Japan and the United States
take measures to alleviate their problems if they wish to
maintain a cooperative relationship. From a global
perspective it is their responsibility as leading economic
powers. Both countries must realize that each will act in the
best interest of its own cultural identity and national
security, which may not always be consistent with the other's
desires. This requires a better understanding of the other's
problems and challenges, as well as concentrated efforts by




The end of the Cold War has brought to an end at least
forty years of fear that the Soviet Union and Communism posed
throughout the world. As these fears have subsided, however,
they are being replaced in the United States by the economic
Challenge posed by foreign competitors, and in particular,
Japan. This is being fueled by many factors, including the
ongoing lopsided trade deficit between the United States and
Japan, Japanese purchases of U.S. corporations and the drain
of U.S. technology to Japan. Anti-Japanese opinion is on the
rise and is, in turn, provoking an anti-American backlash in
Japan. America-bashing in Japan is becoming as popular as
Japan-bashing in the United States. Notwithstanding the
validity of some of the arguments on both sides, the result is
increasing neo-nationalist perceptions that have the potential
to drive a wedge between the cooperative aspects of both
countries, which could' polarize them to the extent the
mutually favorable relationship would be jeopardized.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the changing role
of trade and technology in U.S-Japan relations in the post-
Cold War era. It is my hypothesis that if trade/ technology-
related tensions continue to grow, they may become detrimental
to the mutually favorable relationship. This thesis will show
that criticisms on both sides of the Pacific are continually
intensifying. The danger is that they will undermine the
total U.S. -Japan relationship. The challenge is to find a
basis for compromise that will satisfy both sides.
The commitment of the United States to the defense of
Japan has been a major aspect of United States' policy since
the communist takeover of China and North Korea's invasion of
South Korea--which demonstrated the threat that Communism
posed to the Asia-Pacific region. The rebuilding of an
economically sound Japan, nurtured through democratic
principles, has been one of the United States' greatest
foreign policy successes this century. The close relationship
that developed between both countries has served as the
cornerstone which fostered the effective deterrence of Soviet
aggression and maintained stability throughout the Pacific
region. Notwithstanding the occasional domestic tensions,
leaders of both the United States and Japan have viewed the
relationship between them in a mutually favorable light.
However, recent developments in the 1970s and 1980s brought on
by trade and technology difficulties, coupled with the
diminished Soviet threat, have altered the perceptions both
countries hold toward one another—giving rise to the
possibility that the U.S. -Japan relationship could be
seriously jeopardized.
The major issues being addressed from the perspective of
the United States are Japan's trade surplus, limited foreign
access to Japanese markets, largely one way technology
exchanges and Japanese exploitation of U.S. markets and
technology. Most countries engaging in world-wide trade
support the concept of free trade and the principles of
comparative advantage as an effective tool for resource
allocation and a means to attain worldwide economic parity.
Although protectionist trade practices do exist to a certain
degree in most countries, they appear nominal compared to
those practiced by Japan. This has led to increased tensions
on both sides of the pacific.
Many in the United States feel unappreciated for the
enormous role the United States played in Japan's economic
success, and feel that the Japanese are ungrateful. : Starting
with the post World War II reconstruction of Japan, the United
States provided virtually unlimited access to the Japanese in
the field of technology. As Japan has attained its super
economic status, however, the United States has had difficulty
penetrating Japanese markets, while relatively fewer
restrictions govern Japanese owned companies in the United
States. Japan's assertion of its "uniqueness" and practices
abroad such as dumping and successful lobbying in the United
States only exacerbate the growing U.S. frustrations,
especially at a time when trade issues and the overwhelming
trade deficit with Japan are featured in news broadcasts on a
1 Richard Holbrooke, "Japan and the United States: Ending
The Unequal Partnership," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (Winter
1991-1992) : 42.
near daily basis. This has resulted in increased Japanese
competitiveness, exacerbating the current trade imbalance
while successfully shutting out American industries to
Japanese technological advances.
The development and commercialization of new technologies
is increasingly becoming an issue of major concern within the
United States. Japanese acquisition and control of U.S.-
developed technologies eventually could pose a serious threat
to U.S. national security. On a smaller scale this was
demonstrated during the Gulf War when the United States
appealed to Japan to have its producers of critical components
used on U.S. reconnaissance aircraft step up production.- The
heavy cutbacks in the defense budget due to the end of the
Cold War and disestablishment of the Soviet military machine
have significantly reduced U.S. military research and
development and its ability to custom build its own defense
components. Consequently, the U.S. military must increasingly
rely on the commercial sector to provide its state-of-the-art
equipment. The U.S. Defense Department must increasingly rely
on foreign suppliers for its components as U.S. manufacturers
in areas such as electronics and semiconductors are yielding
to foreign, primarily Japanese, competition. Moreover, the
ability of Japan to obtain and exploit this technology
Stuart Auerbach, "The U.S. Achilles' Heel in Desert
Storm, " The Washington Post National Weekly Edition , 1-7 April
1991, 51.
exacerbates the ongoing trade deficit, resulting in the loss
of millions of jobs for U.S. employees, and fueling anti-
Japanese sentiment in the United States.
To fully conduct an objective analysis requires an
understanding of the Japanese perspective. In this regard,
whether or not American allegations are accurate is beside the
point. The important point that must be considered, and
treated carefully, is the perceptions of the Japanese
regarding these issues. As negative American perceptions and
hostility toward Japan increase, so too does Japan's hostility
toward the United States. These are not healthy ingredients
for maintaining a cooperative alliance.
The end of the Cold War has resulted in a greater emphasis
on economic factors and less on military power. This is
evident as the United States, during the early 1990s,
experienced a drawdown of its military forces and defense
expenditures partially in an effort to help revive its
declining economic status. On the other hand, Japan's strong
economic position and status as the world's largest creditor
nation in the aftermath of the Cold War has elevated its
influence and position as a world power. This has resulted in
a new school of thought in Japan that questions its
subservient relationship with the United States--especially
among the younger generation who no longer feel a sense of
obligation to Americans. 3 This change in sentiment was
manifested in a survey conducted in Japan in late 1989 which
indicated that many Japanese are tired of being the object of
U.S. finger pointing, and tired of Japan acquiescing to U.S.
demands. They feel the trade and technology problems are due
to the inability of the United States to get its own house in
order and adjust to changing economic conditions." As U.S.
demands continue, so does the Japanese perception of the
United States as an incessant bully who will not let up.
Consequently, U.S. credibility in Japan is on the decline.
Japan has worked hard to achieve economic success, played by
(and adjusted to) the rules imposed by the United States, and
is not likely to tolerate continual U.S. pressure for problems
that can be attributed the internal economic difficulties of
the United States.
In sum, it appears that the current trade and technology-
related tensions may be detrimental to both countries'
interests and undermine the U.S. -Japan alliance. This thesis
maintains that the United States and Japan need to seriously
evaluate the validity of the other's arguments and take
cooperative measures if a successful resolution is to be
achieved. Moreover, the changing paradigm may require a
reevaluation of the nature of their security relationship
"Japan's Hardening View of America," Business Week , II
December 1989, 62-64.
4 Ibid.
which should reflect the realities of contemporary post-Cold
War conditions.
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the Communist
threat, economics and trade related issues have come to the
forefront and been given greater importance. This is
exemplified in Europe's integration into the European
Community, the establishment of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and Malaysia's proposal for an East Asia
Economic Caucus. It is imperative that both Japan and the
United States take active measures to alleviate their problems
if they wish to maintain the mutually favorable relationship
toward one another. From a global perspective it is their
responsibility as leading economic powers. Both countries
must realize that each will act in the best interest of its
own cultural identity and national security, which may not
always be consistent with the other's desires. This requires
a better understanding of the other's problems and challenges,
as well as concentrated efforts by each country to internally
work out its own problems.
II. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between the United States and Japan and
the post-World War II rebuilding of Japan has created one of
the most fascinating success stories in recent history.
Japanese cooperation and hard work throughout the Allied
Occupation, combined with the benevolent leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur, proved to be the successful combination
that provided a strong foundation from which to build this
special relationship. The postwar democratization of Japan
under the guidance of the United States, in addition to the
U.S. -aided economic development, proved to be the key
ingredients in the close political and economic ties that
subsequently followed.
This relationship, however, has come under fire in recent
years; through a myriad of issues from the United States'
"nuclear umbrella" and Japan's share of the defense burden, to
trade deficits and "Buy America" slogans. Many of these
issues have given rise negative rhetoric between the United
States and Japan which could seriously jeopardize the current
security relationship. The purpose of this chapter is to
analyze the development of the U.S. -Japan security
relationship since the postwar period, consider the
possibilities that may affect its future development, and
demonstrate the need for a continued, cooperative relationship.
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A. THE OCCUPATION: POLICIES AND REFORMS
The shaping of U.S. -Japan policy during the Occupation
culminated with the initial security treaty in 1951. For
numerous reasons that arose during this timeframe both Japan
and the United States realized the need for a mutual agreement
that served the interests of both nations.
The aftermath of World War II found Japan in a precarious
position whereby her destiny would be the product--one way or
another--of evolving U.S. -Soviet relations. War-torn Japan
lay on the verge of economic and political collapse. The
Allied Occupation Forces consisted of British, Australian, and
primarily U.S. troops, under the direction General Douglas
MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP) . Given Japan's aggressive behavior throughout the war,
the primary objective of the Occupation was to transform the
country from an aggressive, militaristic nation into a more
benign, peaceful one under democratic rule. The Russian
threat and Cold War had not yet come to fruition; and security
and stability in the Pacific region was contingent upon a
Japan that posed no threat to its neighbors. If Japan's
military prowess was destroyed, there could be peaceful
coexistence within the region, with the United Nations and
United States keeping a watchful eye.
It is with the above concepts in mind that the Occupation
embarked upon its "demilitarization" and "democratization"
programs throughout the Occupation. Subsequently, Japan was
demilitarized through the disestablishment of approximately
six million individuals serving in the Imperial Army and Navy.
Some military leaders were tried as war criminals, many others
were banned from holding public office, and the police were
decentralized. In less than a year the Occupation forces were
successful in neutralizing the Japanese war machine beyond any
offensive or defensive capability.
General MacArthur believed the successful rehabilitation
of Japan rested with the transformation of Japan into a
parliamentary state, while preserving the position of the
emperor in some respect--noting that the emperor was essential
to the political and cultural survival and was inherent in the
Japanese system. It was with this in mind that MacArthur
quickly drafted a constitution which preserved the monarchy,
but only as a symbol of the state and unity of the people, and
without any sovereign power. Additionally, Article IX was
developed, in which Japan renounced war:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of setting
international disputes ... land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized. 5
John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, Will Japan
Rearm?: A Study in Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), 116.
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Several other major changes occurred as a direct result of
the constitution: prewar elites were abolished or subordinated
to the cabinet, which became a "committee" of the majority
party or coalition in the Diet; both houses of the Diet became
fully elective, and the franchise was extended to all men and
women aged twenty or over; the Supreme Court was given the
power to pass on the constitutionality of Diet legislation;
governorships of prefectures were made elective; and human
rights were guaranteed.
The accomplishments of the Occupation could not have taken
place without the strong will and flexibility of the Japanese
people, who soon realized the spirit of the Occupation was
benevolent rather than forceful. Moreover, SCAP ' s utilization
of the Japanese administrative structure to implement many of
the reforms allowed MacArthur to achieve his goals with little
resistance
.
The Occupation was successful in a number of areas; many
of which set the stage for Japan's success in later years.
The emergence of the' small, independent and somewhat
prosperous Japanese farmer was a result of the land reform
program. The government bought the land owned by absentee
landlords and sold it at low interest rates to former tenants.
John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reishauer, and Albert M.
Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation , rev. ed .
,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 820-821.
11
Land worked by tenants dropped from 46 to 10 percent as
private ownership rose.
The powerful Zaibatsu companies were also on the hit list
of the reformers. These powerful companies were broken into
smaller organizations by freezing their assets and
implementing a levy on capital. Moreover, inheritance taxes
and anti-monopoly laws were established by SCAP to prevent
these corporations from amassing their previously held power.
Further reforms were planned for twelve hundred additional
companies in 1947; however, for external reasons which will be
discussed in the following paragraphs, these reforms did not
occur as the Occupation switched to a more recovery-oriented
policy
.
By the late 1940s a major policy shift took place in Japan
as a result of the emergence of the Soviet Union as a
potential adversary to the United States. Due to the Soviet
actions in Eastern Europe, and to counter the threat of Soviet
expansionism, the United States adopted its new policy of
containment at the urging of George F. Keenan from the State
Department. Although the containment theories focused
primarily on Western Europe, its policies were applicable to
Japan as well
.
The Strategy of containment brought together the new
American interest in maintaining a global balance of power
with the perceived Muscovite challenge to that
Fairbank, 822
12
equilibrium. ... It sought to deal with that danger
primarily by economic rather than military means; its goal
was not so much the creation of an American hegemony as it
was a re-creation of independent centers of power capable
of balancing each other as well as the Russians."
This shift in U.S. policy could not have come at a better
time for Japan. Economic conditions within the country by
1948 were pretty grim, and exacerbated by an excessive number
of ex-servicemen and individuals formerly employed in the now
ex-Japanese colonies. The chain of events that occurred
during this period were critical in the shaping of the future
Japan through U.S. foreign policy. The Cold War, intensified
by China's fall to communism in 1949 and the outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950, further demonstrated the need for the
insurance of a secure, economically stable ally in Japan.
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru firmly believed that the
post-war success of Japan was contingent upon its ability to
rapidly achieve economic growth, and realized that Japan's
special relation with its "big brother" was an avenue to
prosperity. Yoshida commented to an associate in 1946 that
"history provides examples of winning by diplomacy after
losing in war,"" exemplifying his confidence in the future
prosperity of Japan through its subordination to the United
States
.
John L. Gaddis, The Loner Peace (New York: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 1987), 43.
q Fairbank, 826.
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From the beginning of the Occupation until 1947, future
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru believed the future of Japan
rested in the assumption that a treaty, punitive in nature,
would be concluded with the allies— including the Soviet Union
as well as the United States. If this were the case, Yoshida
concluded that he would attempt to obtain separate security
guarantees from the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain
and China. He would then declare Japan's permanent
neutrality, similar to the role of Switzerland in Europe. -0
As the Cold War took shape, however, Prime Minister
Yoshida realized that tension between the Soviet Union and the
United States was continually growing, especially in regard to
the future of Germany and Korea. He was also aware that
President Truman considered Japan's future a high priority.
Yoshida realized that the United States might be willing to
conclude a peace settlement with Japan without the
participation of the Soviet Union; 11 and if this was the
case, it was highly probable that a non-punitive peace treaty
would result. Moreover,' as it was likely that an adversarial
relationship would develop between Japan and the Soviet Union
if a separate peace treaty took place with the United States,
Japan would subsequently seek protection from the Soviet
10 Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy,
1947-1986 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 16.
ii Yoshida, Memoirs, p. 263. As cited in Weinstein, 17
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threat in the form of a security settlement with the United
States
.
The primary concern of Prime Minister Yoshida and possible
stumbling block to his doctrine was, therefore, that the
growing intensity of the Cold War relationship between the
Soviet Union and the U.S. /Japan would eventually call for a
rearmed Japan; therefore hindering his economic reform package
due to defense spending requirements. Yoshida decided it was
in Japan's best interest to allow the United States to
provide for its national security while his country
concentrated on its economic priorities. This policy of
giving primacy to economics became known as the Yoshida
Doctrine . '-
By 1949 the United States had adopted its Defensive
Perimeter Strategy as its primary policy regarding strategic
issues in East Asia. In March, 1948, the Director of the
State Department's Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan,
sent a message to George C. Marshall, Secretary of State,
expressing his concern over the lack of "...any overall
strategic concept for the entire western Pacific area." 1 '
The thrust of Kennan ' s recommendations in regard to the
political-strategic concept focused on the defense of the
offshore islands, and the avoidance of any direct commitments
12 Fairbank, 825
13 Gaddis, 73 .
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on the Asian continent in the wake of China's fall to
communism: "While we would endeavor to influence events on the
mainland of Asia in ways favorable to our security, we would
not regard any mainland areas as vital to us." 14
Kennan ' s comments and recommendations were a reflection of
the growing concern for the strategic posture of the Pacific
region, and served as a catalyst for the subsequent
development of the Defensive Perimeter Strategy, which by mid
1949 had become widely accepted.
The commitment of the United States to the offshore
islands was widely supported. In June, 1949 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff noted that "from the military point of view, the
ultimate which we are rapidly being forced, requires at least
our present degree of control of the Asian offshore chain. "^
In November the same year a State Department memo noted
Pentagon sources supporting the strategy, citing that "our
position is not directly jeopardized by the loss of China so
long as the security of the islands continues to be
maintained." 16 And a paper from the National Security
Council in December noted that the minimal forces required to
14 Gaddis, 73.
15 NSC 49, "Strategic Evaluation of United States Security
Needs in Japan," 9 June 1949, VII, 774-75. As cited in
Gaddis, 74.
16 State Department Consultants Report, "Outline of Far
Eastern and Asian Policy for review with the President,"
enclosed in Philip C. Jessup to Acheson, November 16, 1949,
ibid., pp. 1211-12. As cited in Gaddis, 75.
16
defend against the Soviet threat in the Asian region required
"at least our present military position in the Asian offshore
island chain, and in the event of war its denial to the
Communists." 1 " Additionally, General MacArthur went as far
as to say that after World War II the U.S. frontier had
extended from the coast of California to the Asian offshore
island chain, and that the national security of the United
States depended on the ability of the United States to protect
those offshore islands, keeping them out of hostile hands. 18
The Defensive Perimeter Strategy, and its subsequent
abandonment with the commitment of U.S. troops to the Korean
Peninsula when the North invaded the South, reflected the
commitment of the United States to the prevention of the
communist spread in the pacific region. This further
reinforced the U.S. position of ensuring the creation of an
economically sound and democratic Japan.
The end of the Occupation and peace settlement with Japan
culminated with two agreements— the peace and security
treaties— fulfilling the needs and interests of the State and
Defense departments respectively. The State Department was
able to achieve the peace settlement based on formal equality
17 NSC 48/1, "The Position of the United States with
Respect to Asia," December 23, 1949, U.S. Department of
Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-67 [hereafter
cited as Pentagon Papers] (Washington: 1971), VIII, 257. As
cited in Gaddis, 75.
18 Gaddis, 74.
17
for Japan, and the needs of the Defense Department were met
through the acceptance of a continued, indefinite U.S.
presence.- Prior to the settlement, however, John Foster
Dulles, emissary of the U.S. Secretary of State and the man
responsible for negotiating both treaties through the Senate,
made several trips to Japan in 1950 in an attempt to convince
Japan to re-arm as a condition for the Peace Treaty and
restoration of Japan's sovereignty. Prime Minister Yoshida
refused, however, and cited Article Nine of the constitution,
in which Japan renounces war and will never maintain land,
sea, or air forces. Yoshida 's motives were primarily
economic, and he had no intentions of thwarting his economic
strategy by having to re-arm and allocate funds toward defense
spending. Besides, the demands of the United States to
maintain its own military presence in Japan obviated the need
for a Japanese defense posture. When Yoshida was presented
with concerns vis-a-vis Japan's submission to the United
States, he was noted as saying "When it is objected that Japan
will become a colony of the United States, [I] always repl [y]
that, just as the United States was once a colony of the Great
Britain but is now the stronger of the two, if Japan became a
Kataoka Tetsuya and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an
Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S. -Japan Security
Alliance (Boulder, San Francisco, and London: Westview Press,
Inc., 1989), 12.
18
colony of the United States, it will also eventually become
the stronger . " --
On 8 September, 1951 Japan signed a peace treaty with
forty eight nations including the United States, but excluding
the Soviet Union and China, who boycotted. On April 28, 1952
Japan's independence was restored. At the same time Japan and
the United States also concluded the Mutual Security Treaty,
under which Japan's security was guaranteed by the United
States. Moreover, the persistence of Dulles paid off,
although to a somewhat lesser degree. In return for the U.S.
"security blanket" Yoshida conceded the presence of U.S.
military bases in Japan and the establishment of a small
indigenous military defense force called the National Police
Reserve, which was renamed the National Safety Force and
finally, in 1954, the Self Defense Force (SDF)
.
Yoshida Relented on the need for self-help. With that,
the difference between Dulles and Yoshida narrowed. Dulles
demanded a military force of 350,000, roughly equal to the
peacetime standing force of the Imperial Army in the
1920s. He justified it with the assumption that a Soviet
invasion of Japan on the order of the Korean War was
likely. Yoshida held fast to MacArthur's assumption that
discounted such a scenario, and he has been proved
correct. From here on, the difference between Dulles and
Yoshida was not over self-help vs. free ride but over how
much self-help was adequate for Japan. J1
20 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States , 1950, VII, 1166. As cited in Kataoka, 14.
- 1 Kataoka, 15.
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B. POST-OCCUPATION: ECONOMIC RISE
The mainstay of Japan's success after the Occupation has
been its economic prowess. The reforms that were implemented
throughout the Occupation, combined with the strong Japanese
concepts of loyalty and will to succeed, proved the perfect
ingredients to a healthy economic recovery. Moreover, many
restrictive policies and protectionist practices were
implemented in an effort to ensure the survivability of
Japan's newly restructured industrial base. The United States
and many of its allies tolerated these practices, realizing
the importance of an economically strong and democratic Japan.
United States procurement for the Korean War provided the
impetus for Japan's bustling economy. The North Korean
invasion of South Korea elevated the geographic importance of
Japan as the primary staging location and basis of operations
for the United States and United Nations military forces.
Extensive military procurement orders with Japan during the
Korean War precipitated the first industrial-manufacturing
boom in Japan since the pre-war era. Yoshida referred to the
Korean War as "a gift from the gods."^ 2
By the 1960s the economy had shown remarkable improvement,
and throughout the decade averaged unprecedented annual growth
12 Fairbank, 826.
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rates of approximately ten percent in real terms.- In fact,
the Japanese economy was growing at such a rate that it was
actually doubling every seven years.- 4
Notwithstanding the skill, dedication, and strong work
ethic of the Japanese, the United States played an
instrumental role in ensuring Japan's economic success. The
United States established liberal trading practices with
Japan, and encouraged the importation of Japanese goods--
becoming the country's single most important trading partner.
Additionally, the United States shared its science and
technology with Japan in an effort to decrease the
technological gap. Japan's scientists and engineers soon
realized that, as was the case in the television and
semiconductor industries, they could not only utilize this
technology, but improve upon it and produce a better product.
By the early 1970s Japanese industrial success had
elevated the country to one of the world's largest trading
partners; and by the mid 1980s, with the United States alone,
had built up a fifty billion dollar surplus.-" The United
States' deficit with Japan, however, has become the subject of
much controversy in recent decades. This has been
23 Edwin 0. Reishauer, The Japanese Today : Change and
Continuity (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press,
1977) , 115.
^ 4 Ibid. , 115.
25 Ibid. , 116.
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precipitated by U.S. allegations of inadequate access to
Japanese markets, Japanese exploitation of U.S. markets, and
the Japanese "free ride" in defense.
C. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
Japan's relationship with the United States since the
Occupation can be characterized as a rollercoaster ride with
its corresponding ups and downs. The consistent, underlying
theme, however, has always been the "security blanket" or
"nuclear umbrella" provided to Japan by the United States
through ensuring stability in the Pacific region and the
protection against the Soviet threat.
Since 1953 Japan has held its special relationship with
the United States in high regard. Given the animosities
between Japan and its neighbors Korea and China caused by
Imperial Japan and World War II, in addition to the Russian
presence looming close by, the U.S. military presence and
security guarantee was a fair price to pay.
Shortly after the Korean War, however, nuances in
perceptions from both sides began occurring as Japan saw
itself starting to take on a new role in the world. This
began in 1956 when Japan was able to gain membership in the
United Nations after the Soviet Union dropped its veto. This
came in the aftermath of negotiations between the Soviet Union
and Japan that resulted in a termination of hostilities rooted
in World War II
.
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This growing self-confidence in Japan fostered feelings of
nationalism and even some anti-American sentiment. Such was
the case in 1960 when the controversy over the revision of the
Security Treaty resulted in extensive political and social
unrest within Japan. Japanese citizens numbering in the
hundreds of thousands protested against the revision—which
was eventually passed in June 1960 in a secret session, and
led to the forced resignation of Prime Minister Kishi
Nobusuke
.
In addition, Japanese self-confidence and sense of
pride was bolstered with the successful hosting of the 1964
Olympic Games in Tokyo. The Games demonstrated to the rest of
the world the success of Japan's industrial, social and
cultural development and had proven that Japan was closing the
gap in achieving parity with the West.
Foreign policy nuances between Japan and the United States
continued to emerge with the differing perceptions vis-a-vis
the Vietnam War. Most Japanese officials were opposed to the
United States' involvement in Vietnam and felt that Japan
might be drawn into the conflict in some sort of military
posture. As a result, some Japanese politicians at that time
were advocating a policy of "equidistance" between the United
States and the Soviet Union.-' The negative attitudes of the
Japanese were reflected in 1968 as student and political
unrest led to nationalistic demands for the return of Okinawa
- b Holbrooke, 46
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to Japan. These problems reflected even broader issues vis-a-
vis the national security interest of both countries as the
ten year term of the revised 1960 Security Treaty was coming
to a close in 1970; either side had the option of a subsequent
revision or termination. Fortunately, however, these issues
were effectively resolved. In 1969 the United States turned
over the control of Okinawa to Japan. The pullout of American
troops from Vietnam--combined with President Nixon's visit to
China opening the door for improved relations between both
Japan and the United States to China--resulted in an era of
strong cooperation and friendship between Japan and the United
States
.
This renewed positive relationship was important in the
bitter aftermath of Vietnam in that it demonstrated to Japan
and its neighbors the continued commitment of the United
States to Japan and the region. "The cooperation between the
United States and Japan during the late 1970s and most of the
1980s was an important ingredient in the reversal of the
perception that America was retreating from the Pacific after
Vietnam. "- 7
Through putting most of its economic eggs in one basket,
however, Japan found itself even more dependent on the United
States for its security.
Ibid
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The astounding success of the Japanese in
international trade had also made their dependence on the
outside world all the more obvious. Despite their new
pride and self-confidence, they felt even more helpless in
the face of developments in the rest of the world In
the autumn of 1973 a worse blow fell when the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries < OPEC) ... quadrupled the
price of oil. No major nation was harder hit than Japan,
which relies on imported oil for more than 60 percent of
its total energy resources .... the lesson of Japan's
extreme economic vulnerability to external forces remained
clearly etched on Japanese minds.-'
D. CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS IN 1992: THE NEED FOR CONTINUED
U.S. -JAPAN RELATIONS
The demise of the Soviet Union has in many ways obviated
the main principles upon which the U.S. -Japan security
relationship was organized. This, coupled with the current
trade and economic-related friction, call for a new basis for
maintaining the relationship. The need for a cordial U.S.-
Japan relationship is of vital importance to both countries in
regard to maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
This is important for a number of reasons: to ensure regional
stability and the safe passage of trade; to give assistance to
Japan which will enable it to assume a greater regional and
international role; and to help stem the tide of mistrust
among Japan's neighbors which are founded in the memories of
Imperial Japan.
The post-Cold War era has presented Japan with the dilemma
whereby it has matured into a major world power and must
- 3 Reischauer, 118.
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assume a greater responsibility throughout the world. How
Japan deals with this increased responsibility, and how Asia
responds no Japan's increased role depends largely on U.S.
participation. Moreover, despite Japan's economic influence,
they are not willing to assume the role of sole political
leader within the region. For example, in 1991 Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir suggested that Japan lead the creation
of an East Asian Economic Group constructed along the lines of
the European Community and NAFTA. Japan refused the offer
insisting that U.S. participation and leadership must first be
included. -
'
History has demonstrated that when serious economic and
trade trouble with the west occurred, Japan had visions of a
self-sufficient economic bloc encompassing China and Manchuria
by use of military force. As these tensions came to fruition,
Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor and proceeded down the
Malay peninsula to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies to
ensure its availability to natural resources and an adequate
oil supply.
Outside of the context of a U.S. -Japan relationship, and
considering Japan's great resource needs, the possibility
exists that, if the oil supply and resources to Japan were
threatened, Japan could seek regional domination. According
Yo'shi Tsurumi, "U. S . -Japanese Relations: From
Brinkmanship to Statesmanship," World Policy Journal 7, no. 1
(Winter 1989-90) : 583 .
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to Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs:
Japanese are always quick to remind the rest of the world
how resource-poor and vulnerable they are. This
vulnerability may rempt Japan to seek primacy or
domination in areas chat contain vital natural resources
or important trading partnerships. . . .It would be a tragedy
if Japan were to attempt, in a nonmilitary form, to
control certain resources or regions of the world.... In
the modern world, any nation that seeks to dominate any
region of the world through either political or economic
pressure risks massive economic retaliation from other
major trading nations.'
A more alarmist perspective raises the possibility of
future Japanese military domination of the region. In their
book "The Coming War With Japan" George Friedman and Meredith
Lebard maintain that an inevitable chain of events will cause
Japan to seek military domination within the region.'
The growth of the Japanese economy has been and continues
to be export driven. However, due to the lack of resources
within Japan's island nation, Japan is equally dependant on
the imports of raw materials for its economic survival. For
Japan to successfully continue as an export oriented economy,
it is paramount that the Japanese maintain access to the
countries supplying the raw materials as well as maintaining
secure sea lanes for the transportation of these supplies.
30 Holbrooke, 55-56.
31 George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War
With Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 317,320,390-
392 .
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Although every country is dependent on imports to varying
degrees, of the industrialized nations none are as dependent
on their imports as Japan. To further illustrate this
dependence; when considering import and export tonnage, in
the late 1980s Japan imported 667,671,000 metric tons and
exported 81,368,000 metric tons, at a ratio of 8.206 to 1 . ;2
Therefore, Japan needed to import over 8 tons of imported raw
materials to produce one ton of exports. As a point of
comparison, the U.S. import /export ratio was 1.384 to I. 3
'
This makes Japan particularly vulnerable and dependent on the
stability and supply of those nations from whom they import.
Although Japan is a creditor nation financially, they are a
debtor nation in regard to the physical balance of materials.
Any dramatic shift in the shipping industry or supply of raw
materials to Japan would most certainly be disastrous to their
economic well-being.
Throughout the Cold War the United States assumed the role
of Japan's protector against the Soviet threat, as well as
maintaining stability within the region and assuring safe
passage through the sea lanes. Although the changing paradigm
in the post-Cold War era alters the role of the United States
regarding the Soviet part of the equation, its presence is
:
- Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency,
Government of Japan. Cited in Friedman, 186
33 United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States , Washington, D.C., 1989.
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still needed to maintain stability and ensure safe passage of
shipping for all trading nations. The level of importance
given to economic/trade issues is more understandable when
realizing that U.S. military presence within the Pacific
region helps to ensure the stability of two-way transpacific
trade in excess of over 300 billion dollars per year, nearly
double the amount of transatlantic trade. :4 Moreover, by
1992 U.S. firms invested over 61 billion dollars throughout
the Asia-Pacific region, while Asian investment in the United
States was approximately 95 billion dollars.-' 1
In regard to the Asia-Pacific region, most nations
recognize the advantages and opportunities Japan's economic
prowess can offer, however, they are extremely apprehensive
about a more autonomous Japan outside the purview of a U.S.-
Japan cooperative arrangement. This is understandable given
Imperial Japan's behavior up to and including World War II.
For example, the Southeast Asian nations, notably Singapore,
continue to hold a deep-rooted mistrust which continues almost
50 years later in the post-Cold War era. Despite the fact
that Japan has become a primary source of trade, technology
and economic aid for the regional nations, they maintain that
34 U.S. Department of Defense, "A strategic Framework for
the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century," (19
April 1990) : 37.
3? James A. Baker, III., "America in Asia: Emerging
Architecture for a Pacific Community, " Foreign Affairs 70, no.
5 (Winter 1991/1992) : 4.
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their uncertainty regarding Japanese intentions will continue
until the younger generations of Japanese are educated about
the atrocities committed by their country up to and including
World War II. 31 Some of these countries maintain that the
prevailing attitudes in Japan are not feelings of remorse as
a result of their behavior, but feelings of regret that they
lost the war. Leaders in both Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia have openly criticized the Japanese education
system, which in its textbooks plays down and at times
overlooks the Japanese invasion and atrocities in Southeast
Asia. This eventually prompted Singapore's Senior Minister,
Lee Kuan Yew, to express his displeasure that Japan has not
been "open and frank about the atrocities and horrors
committed" , adding that because Japan has not educated its
young people about their previous behavior in the region, "the
victims suspect and fear that Japan does not think these acts
were wrong, and that there is no Japanese change of heart." 3.
Factors such as Asia's memory of Imperial Japan and
Japan's uncertainty about its own political role in Asia might
preclude it from successfully establishing any type of Asian
dominance. Japan is all too aware that her previous forays
into Asia led to war, and as a result would prefer to maintain
Michael Richardson, "Regional Mistrust Increasing,
"





a more subdued profile while continuing its economic
diplomacy. In light of the historical evidence and internal
uncertainty, Japan's foreign policy has been to refrain from
meddling in other countries' affairs to avoid accusations of
once again attempting to gain regional domination. Japan's
mild reaction to the bloody Chinese military attack on the
demonstrators in Beijing in 1989 is an example of this policy.
In short, as a result of Imperial Japan's actions, the
Japanese themselves realize the scars and attitudes still
harbored by those nations, and consequently show some
reluctance in taking on a broader foreign policy role--a role
which is inevitable given their economic status. Japan's
dilemma, therefore, is how it can take on a greater regional
role without creating undue friction with its neighbors and
without the Japanese themselves becoming overzealous . The
most acceptable solution would be through its continued
relationship with the United States.
Keeping within the framework of a U.S. -Japan alliance, as
well as multi-national efforts, will help to stem the tide of
mistrust within the region. Notwithstanding the economic-
related difficulties, Japan remains steadfast in its
commitment to the U.S. -Japan security relationship as a means
of preserving stability in the region:
Under Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the
U.S. is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan
by its military forces for the purpose of contributing to
31
the security of Japan and to the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East.
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty naturally focuses on the
security aspect. Simultaneously, it includes important
provisions on political and economic cooperation. The
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in fact lays the basis for a
cooperative relationship between the two countries over a
wide area, not only in the area of defense but also in
political, economic and social areas."''
Economics aside, Japan is beginning to play a broader
regional political role, and in most cases within the
framework of U. S
.
/multinational operations. For example,
Japan's commitment of minesweepers as its contribution to the
Gulf War was an indication of this change. Japan has also
been assuming a greater role vis-a-vis its neighbors. As the
Cambodian issue intensified in the late 1980s, Japan took on
a role as mediator in an effort to resolve the conflict.
Through a series of meetings with foreign officials and
factions, Tokyo played a major role in the negotiations.
Japan has also assumed a larger role in helping to resolve the
Korean issue, but again, within the framework of the U.S.-
Japan alliance. Normalization negotiations between Tokyo and
Pyongyang, encouraged by ROK President Roh Tae-Woo in 1988 for
53 Japan's Defense Agency, Defense of Japan , translated
by Japan Times, Ltd., 1991, 60.
3Q Ibid.
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improved U . S . -Japanese relations with North Korea, is a case
in pome/
One of the more controversial issues regarding a greater
Japanese role deals with their Self Defense Force (SDF) and
defense policy. Changes brought about in the post -Cold War
era have necessitated the redefining of Japanese defense
policy to take on greater responsibility. Factors such as the
U.S. military withdrawal from the Philippines and possibility
of further drawdown of forces in the region, and criticism of
Japanese burdensharing and lack of participation in the Gulf
War call for a Japanese defense posture which assumes a
greater regional role.
Caution must be exercised, however, regarding an
overzealous Japanese Defense buildup, as history has left many
scars on those previously subject to Japanese Imperial
aggression--notably Japan's neighbors. The regional response
to Japan's sending Minesweepers to the Gulf was met with both
support and opposition. The apparent acquiescence of some
Asian nations, notably the Philippines and Thailand, signified
a nominal acceptance of an increased Japanese military role in
international affairs. 41 Other nations, however, were more
40 Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan's External Policy in a Time of
Change, " presented at the Symposium on East Asia Transformed:
New Patterns of Cooperation in the 1990s, November 15-16,
1991, Pusan, Korea. 12.
41 Masaru Tamamoto, "Japan's Uncertain Role, " World Policy
Journal 8, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 581.
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apprehensive. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew summed
up Japan's involvement in the Gulf War by stating that
"allowing the Japanese to participate in military operations
was like giving an alcoholic liqueur chocolates ." 4_
E. OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS
History has served as a reminder to Japan that their
overzealous, unchecked actions in Asia can result in war.
Nevertheless, the changing world order and Japan's economic
success call for them to play a more active role. Japan's
dilemma, therefore, is how it will play a more responsible,
active role in the region while simultaneously coping with
Asia's strong apprehension of a more "independent" Japan.
Japan's broader participation under the umbrella of U.S.-
Japan/multilateral efforts has been a step in the right
direction
.
A Japan outside of the U.S. nuclear umbrella would most
likely feel threatened by its nuclear-capable neighbors.
Coupled with ongoing disputes such as Russia and the Kuril
Islands; China and the Senkaku Islands; and the "Korean dagger
pointed at the heart of Japan, " the potential for military
conflict clearly exists—although to a lesser degree than
during the Cold War. Regarding Asia, and China specifically,
Masaru Tamamoto, Director of the Center for Asian Studies at
2 Ibid. , 584.
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The American University School of International Service,
warns
:
Should the security treaty be terminated, the Japan
question would undoubtedly loom over Asia once again,
greatly complicating the politics of the region. Japan
does not want to exercise sole political leadership in
Asia, and China will not accept such Japanese leadership.
This is why the U.S. presence in Asia is so important to
the leaders of Japan and China. 45
The role of the United States is a very important factor
in the equation which needs to be emphasized. However, the
economic and technological difficulties the United States
faces has cast some doubt on America's leadership ability:
Most Asian countries, nevertheless, favor continued
American commitment and involvement in the world. Gone
are the days when developing countries could reap
advantage from the rivalry between Moscow and Washington;
they now line up for the services of the United States as
an "honest broker" of peace. These expectations
notwithstanding, the United States is losing its own
economic and technological leadership, a failing that
calls into question the sustainability of its military and
political power. 44
In the post-Cold War era, with the threat of communism no
longer a factor, a new paradigm has emerged which focuses more
closely on the economic factors. This has resulted in a shift
in the focus of the United States from the perception of the
43 Ibid. , 590-591.
44 Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and America: Global Partners,
"
Foreign Policy 86 (Spring 1992): 30.
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Soviet expansionist threat to the economic threat posed to the
United States. Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner writes:
The most obvious specific impact of the new world order
is that, except for Soviet nuclear weaponry, the
preeminent threat to U.S. national security now lies in
the economic sphere. The United States has turned from
being a major creditor nation to the world's greatest
debtor, and there are countless industries where U.S.
companies are no longer competitive. We must, then,
redefine "national security" by assigning economic
strength greater prominence. . . . 4 -
The close relationship that developed between both
countries has served as the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the
Asia-Pacific region throughout the Cold War. Notwithstanding
the occasional domestic tensions, both the United States and
Japan have viewed the relationship between them in a mutually
favorable light. However, the end of the Cold War has
resulted in a greater emphasis on economic factors. The
potential for conflict between the United States and Japan
exists in the more contemporary issues such as the trade
imbalance, market liberalization, and U.S. dependence on
Japanese technology. 45 Developments in the 1970s and 1980s
in these areas between the United States and Japan have
altered many of the perceptions both countries hold toward one
another, and given rise to the possibility that the security
relationship could jeopardized.
Stansfield Turner, "Intelligence for a New World
Order," Foreign Affairs Vol. 70, No. 4 (Fall 1991): 151
4b Funabashi, "Japan and America: Global Partners," 27.
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Considering U.S. economic interests in the Asia-Pacific
region, it is imperative that the United States not abandon
its influence and position in the region, and more
specifically, Japan. James A. Baker, former Secretary of
State, noted in late 1991, "The keystone of our engagement in
East Asia and the Pacific is our relationship with Japan.
Nothing is more basic to the prosperity and security of the
region, and indeed to the effectiveness of the post-Cold War
system, than a harmonious and productive U.S. -Japan
relationship . " 47
Given the global influence that both nations possess, and
the need to maintain regional stability and trade, it is
important that a strong bilateral relationship (perhaps
adjusted to meet contemporary conditions) be maintained. To do
this successfully, both the United States and Japan must seek
to resolve any differences which might alienate their
relationship. This requires that both countries seriously
seek to resolve the trade and technology issues and related
sentiment which serves as the greatest threat to this
relationship. The resolution of the economic/ trade related
problems, one way or another, and the public sentiment and
perceptions of both countries, will most assuredly effect the
tone and direction of the future relationship between them as




The roots of U.S. -Japan trade disputes and differing
perceptions can be traced back to the arrival of Commodore
Matthew C. Perry at Tokyo Bay in 1853. Commodore Perry was
sent to Tokyo along with three frigates and five other ships
to negotiate a trade agreement and opening of Japanese ports
to U.S. ships. Perry delivered his proposal with a promise to
return the following year for a reply. Upon his return the
Japanese consented and signed the Treaty of Kanagawa, which in
effect opened up two ports and allowed limited trade. The
difficulties began three years later in 1856 with the arrival
of the new U.S. consul to Japan, Townsend Harris. Japan,
reluctant to open its markets to the West, felt that the
United States was being too forceful. Harris was thwarted by
a myriad of stalling tactics mirrored in modern day trade
negotiations. Initially Japan decided the treaty was no
longer in their best interests and therefore would not be
honored. It took Harris two years of painstakingly slow
negotiations to finally reach a compromise.
More recently, at the onset of the post-World War II era,
Japan was faced with the major task of rebuilding its war-torn
country. In an effort to protect their industries and give
themselves the latitude to develop without fear of outside
competition, Japan implemented stringent import tariffs and
38
quota restrictions. The United States accepted these
restrictions as a necessary evil, realizing the importance and
necessity for an economically sound Japan, at least until
Japan was no longer economically vulnerable and could stand on
its own. As time passed and Japan became stronger, most
industry-protecting barriers remained intact, resulting in
increased pressure in the early 1960s by the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to ease its restrictions.
The past thirty years have seen Japan yield piecemeal by
eliminating many of the earlier quota restrictions, although
in many cases the quotas have been offset by a subsequent
tariff increase on the items in question.'10 Through
continued worldwide pressure Japan has made limited
concessions in its trade practices. For example, from the mid
1980s to early 1990s, the trade deficit decreased from
approximately 60 billion to 47 billion dollars. 4 ' However,
it is strongly felt by some that real progress will not occur
until Japan undergoes a fundamental change in its concepts of
trade. Author of Japan's Unequal Trade , Edward Lincoln,
states that "Despite this continued formal opening of the
market, however, the sense of pervasive restrictions through
informal means has persisted. These are the implicit
4
" Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 14.
49
"Japan Opens the Export Spigot, " Business Week , 2 9 June
1992, 50-51.
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restraints that are so difficult to verify and remove because
they are so deniable."
A. DIVISIVE ISSUES
A partial explanation of Japan's reluctance to welcome
foreign goods lies in the Japanese mindset which has struggled
between Japan's rise and economic influence throughout the
world and Japanese perception of themselves as being separate
from the rest of humanity. Edwin 0. Reischauer explained
Japan's dichotomy as being:
...both self-satisfied almost to the point of arrogance
and at the same time somewhat ill at ease with others.
They are simultaneously world leaders and world loners.
This situation is confusing not only to others but also to
the Japanese themselves. It gave rise to the great
'Nihonj in-ron' debate in the 1970s over what it meant to
be a Japanese." 51
This feeling of separateness has contributed to the
current trade difficulties through some of Japan's outlandish
contentions such as: foreign beef is unsuitable for the
Japanese because they have thirty additional feet of
intestines; exclusion of foreign construction firms because
Japan has dirt incompatible with U.S. machinery; and
exclusion of U.S. garbage disposals due to incompatibility
395
''° Ibid., 14.
1 Reischauer, The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity ,
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with the Japanese sewage systems."' Table 1 at the end of
this chapter lists some of the informal, deniable barriers the
United States has experienced in attempted exports to Japan
throughout the 1980s.
A key argument in Japan's defense is that it is in the
process of adapting to a more liberalized trade system, and
the United States must not interfere with this progress by
adopting a more controlled or managed trade system. The only
practical solution is to simply leave Japan alone and allow
them to work out their own ambiguities through a type of
economic evolutionary process. : Yoshi Tsurumi, professor of
International Business at Baruch College, City University of
New York and president of the Pacific Basin Center Foundation
stated in 1989 that American fears about Japanese trade
practices and world economic domination have in turn given
rise to a "backlash of anti-American feelings in Japan and
emboldened a rising generation of neonationalist
hardliners. . . .The United States must realize that no action is
better than a lot of 'wrong actions and that offering a
positive vision is a more powerful inducement than endless
threats. " L4 Moreover, Professor Tsurumi recommends that the
United States and Japan should avoid a bilateral managed trade
c
' 2
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system and instead opt for negotiations through GATT in favor
of a multilateral free trade system.
In certain respects, Professor Tsurumi ' s arguments are
valid, and as progress is being made in some areas, the United
States is faced with the dilemma of encouraging this "opening
up" of Japanese markets while continually exerting pressure
without exacerbating ongoing neonationalist tensions. In
certain aspects Japanese society is undergoing a
transformation which may ease the difficulty between Japan and
the United States. As Japan becomes wealthier and more secure
in its prosperity, attitudes are shifting to an emphasis on
leisure time and quality of life and less on material reward.
This is reflected in shorter working hours, more offices
closed on Saturdays, and consideration by government
authorities to bring Japanese work hours more in line with the
work hours of other countries." 1 Additionally, more Japanese
are becoming less willing to pay exorbitantly high prices for
Japanese domestic goods that discourage imports, and in the
future will be less likely to tolerate higher prices caused by
protectionism." Changes within Japanese society as well as
?r
' Ibid.
c,fa Alan D. Romberg and Tadashi Yamamoto, Same Bed,
Different Dreams: America and Japan Societies in Transition





Japanese perceptions will be addressed further in
Chapter V.
Due to some improvements and changes in Japan, some U.S.
officials, although recognizing the continuing need for
change, are a little reluctant to take stronger measures that
might be perceived as coo offensive by the Japanese. At a
hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitiveness in May 1990, U.S. Trade
representative, Carla A. Hills, maintained that Japan is
continually progressing toward free trade reform and that
sanctions should not be imposed under the Super 301 statutory
authority."* In some instances this is true, and for this
reason the United States must proceed cautiously with
retaliatory measures while inroads are being made. Apple
Computer, for example, has increased its sales from 55,000 in
1988 to an estimated 180,000 by the end of 1992, which puts it
in the top five computers sellers in Japan." Motorola has
had similar success. According to one spokesman, "cultural
and hidden barriers" are still evident, however, Motorola's
r
' 8 U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitiveness, U.S. Trade Relations With
Japan , 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990. S. No. 101-150, 6-7.
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The Super 301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act
identifies specific unfair trade practices as priorities
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60
"Apple? Japan Can't Say No," Business Week , 29 June
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success came when it established a joint venture with
Toshiba. '
It is important to note, however, that the trade
difficulties with Japan are not limited to only the United
States, which demonstrates that all U.S. difficulties are not
simply a measure of Americans not trying hard enough or
failure to understand Japanese culture and traditions. The
past decade has seen frequent cases of complaints filed
against Japan throughout the world. In 1984 the European
Economic Community issued a fifteen page document published in
the Singapore Monitor directed at Japan with accusations of
protectionist practices; subsequent complaints were filed in
1985 and 1986. -
It is not difficult to understand the frustration shared
by other countries when one evaluates the amount of Japanese
imports of manufactured goods compared to the rest of the
world. Table 2 at the end of this chapter indicates that,
although all countries protect their own markets to some
extent, Japan clearly hinders imports in comparison and has
shown little improvement over nearly two decades.
Another study by the U.S. Department of Commerce indicated
that during the period from the early 1960s to 1986, while
Japan was claiming there were no real unfair trade issues as
bl
"Asia Beckons," The Economist , 30 May 92, 63.
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"Tokyo's Protectionism: Time to Fight Back," Singapore
Monitor , 18 January 1985, 15, as cited in Prestowitz, 95.
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a result of liberalizing trade negotiations, their imports of
manufactured goods in i960 were 1.5 percent of their GNP . In
1986, after several rounds of negotiations in which Japan
claimed to have made concessions, manufactured imports rose to
only 1.6 percent. By comparison over the same period the
percent of U.S. manufactured imports rose from under one
percent to 4.4 percent, and the European Economic Community
rose from 1.1 to 4.5 percent.'
Historically, it can be argued that both U.S. acquiescence
and prolonged GATT negotiations have contributed to the
formula of Japan's success. Even after years of negotiations
through GATT, many Japanese barriers remain. The controversy
over the aluminum bat issue in the late 1970s and early 1980s
is a prime example. The production of aluminum requires high
levels of electricity. By the late 1970s Japan was
experiencing high energy costs, which resulted in costly
production of aluminum ingots. The United States, conversely,
had relatively low energy costs, which resulted in the
production of bats much cheaper in the United States than in
Japan. In a free trade situation adhering to the concepts of
comparative advantage, it would therefore be less expensive
for Japan to buy the U.S. produced bats than it would be to
produce their own. This, however, was not the case. The
government -organized Japanese Soft Baseball League consists of
b3 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, "Market Access Indicator," April 1987.
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1,600,000 players and is similar to the U.S. Little League
except that a rubberized baseball is used instead of a
hardball. Numerous attempts by the United States to enter the
market proved unsuccessful. One of the excuses cited by Japan
was that the Japanese players and spectators did not like the
sound that American bats made when they came in contact with
the ball . *
The real conflict ensued when the government-controlled
league required an official league seal stamped on every bat.
Initially Japan would not make the seal available for U.S.
bats, but by 1980, after increased pressure from the United
States, Japan acquiesced. However, when Herbert Cochrane,
Commercial Officer at the American Consulate in Osaka
requested information on obtaining the seals and stamps, the
Japanese once again proved uncooperative, and refused to grant
the information. The Japanese maintained that their form of
rubberized baseball was different and only Japanese aluminum
bats are compatible. Moreover, they argued that numerous
Japanese companies had already been granted contracts and the
introduction of American bats would result in an overly
competitive market. In addition, the introduction of American
bats would set a precedent whereby they would also have to
accept other sporting goods such as volleyballs, resulting in
Lincoln, 146
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an influx of cheap goods from Taiwan.'"' The United States
subsequently filed a complaint with GATT, which resulted in
the Japanese government eliminating its formal standard,
however, in a successful attempt to circumvent GATT, the
baseball league subsequently developed private standards of
its own. This further complicated U.S. production and
curtailed the importation process requiring the individual
inspection of every bat.
In short, even after ten years of GATT negotiations on the
issue and a supposed lifting of restrictions in accordance
with GATT guidelines, the total Japanese aluminum bat market
included less than one percent of imports. 5 ' This argument,
in addition to other similar cases, has resulted in U.S. and
European accusations of Japanese protectionist policies.
Clyde Prestowitz, former high-ranking U.S. Commerce Department
official, sums up his perception of the trade situation with
Japan in the last few decades
:
The recurrent pattern in the relationship between the
United States and Japan had by now become a kind of
ritual. First, the United States would demand that Japan
open its markets. After a prolonged and tedious haggling,
Japan would offer some apparent relaxation of restrictions
and the United States would thank the Japanese profusely
and hail the measures as great progress. Shortly,
however, those sent to execute the new agreements would
find that things did not work as anticipated. They would
br
' Clyde Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan
to Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 97.
bb Ibid. , 99.
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then complain of untairness and of new barriers and renew
the demand for opening.-'
The fundamental principles embodied in GATT such as more
liberal trading practices, elimination of tariffs and reduced
barriers on imports have achieved great success within the
international trade system. Although domestic pressure,
political pressure, and strategic implications practiced to a
certain extent by most countries preclude total elimination of
barriers, GATT has been effective at reducing most barriers on
a world-wide basis to the overall benefit of participating
members. '" The influence of GATT, however, could be waning.
For example, Japan's declaration in late 1990 that the trade
imbalance is not due to their practices is a strong indication
of Japanese unwillingness to act in accordance with the
international trade guidelines supported in GATT, despite
their rhetoric which encourages GATT participation. With
the increasing importance of economics in the balance of
power, this trend can be expected as more countries realize
the important role that economics plays in their national
security. The establishment in the early 1990s of the
economic spheres such as the European Community and NAFTA has
also challenged the relative influence of GATT. For example,
Prestowitz, 77
b8 Lincoln, 153 .
b9 Anthony Rowley, "Stones Through Glass," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 18 June 1992, 80.
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U.S. objections to European subsidies of oil-seed producers in
November 1992 led U.S. Trade Representative, Carla Hills, to
declare that the United States would impose 200 percent
retaliatory sanctions on 300 million dollars worth of European
imports, and in particular, French wines. In response, France
appealed to the European countries to impose retaliatory
tariffs on U.S. goods.
B. EMULATION OF JAPANESE PRACTICES
One of the most serious situations that could result if
Japan's trade practices go unchecked, is the situation that
could develop with the countries of Southeast Asia. The
degree to which Japanese practices effect other nations,
particularly within the Pacific Rim, is important to the
United States due to the substantial amount of trade between
the United States and these countries. Subsequently, U.S.
trade policy must consider a tougher stance toward Japan to
ensure other countries do not attempt to emulate Japanese
trading practices, or even worse, counter the possibility of
total Japanese economic domination within the region.
However, given the current perceptions between both countries,
the situation must be dealt with cautiously. As a result of
Japan's phenomenal economic success since its reconstruction,
70 Stuart Auerbach and William Drozdiak, "EC Takes Action
to Reopen Trade Talks With Washington, " Washing Post , 11
November 19 92, 2A.
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it is possible that the economically developing countries
might regard Japan's protectionist actions or policies such as
trade restrictions as successful and legitimate, and model
their systems accordingly. This could affect the entire
spectrum of international trade.
Although not necessarily detrimental, some Asian countries
have already begun to follow Japan's example in other economic
areas. South Korea and Taiwan have adopted Japan's
comprehensive land reform program, realizing that land reform
was the fundamental change that initially led to Japan's
emergence as an economic contender; and many of the newly
industrializing countries are adopting Japan's export
strategies, promoting production of goods deemed attractive to
the world market.' It is clearly beneficial that these
countries adopt programs and economic reforms that will make
them more competitive on the world market. Regarding trade
practices, however, it is important to the United States that
these countries know when to part with the Japanese model.
Notwithstanding the historical animosities between Japan and
its neighbors, Japan's participation and investment within the
ASEAN countries has given rise to legitimate fears that an
Asia more closely linked to Japan would further complicate the
United States' influence within the region. 7 "
71 Tamamoto, 5 92.
72 Funabashi, "Japan and America: Global Partners," 32
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C. JAPAN'S LOBBYING SUCCESS
Further complicating the existing trade situation is the
apparent lobbying success of Japan in Washington. According
to a report compiled by the Rochester Institute of Technology,
the success of Japanese lobbying has surpassed "all special
interest groups, unions, industries, and both political
parties. It is focused, relentless, amply funded, and
f righteningly successful.
"
7: A prime example of this is the
controversy in the mid 1980s involving the Japanese
exportation of pick-up trucks into the United States. In an
effort to import the trucks under a substantially lower duty
schedule, Japan classified the pick-up trucks as
"automobiles." Realizing the outcry that would ensue from the
American companies, Japan invested in a major lobbying effort
and public relations campaign aimed at convincing the American
public and policy makers that U.S. -Japan relations could be
jeopardized and that higher duties would result in higher
consumer costs. The Japanese lobbyists proved successful and
won approval in Washington, despite the combined efforts of
the major U.S. auto manufacturers, who were concerned with the
impact on the local industry and possible employment cutbacks.
The Japanese victory proved a resounding success. The total
cost incurred for the lobbying and the public relations
efforts was an estimated three to four million dollars, while
Japan-2000, " 87 .
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the evasion of the import duties saved the Japanese over 500
million dollars annually. ' It is important to note that
although Japan is quick to reveal that they maintain no import
tariffs on cars into Japan, they employ a myriad of
inspections, standards, and certification procedures that make
foreign imports of automobiles virtually impossible.
In his book Agents of Influence
, author Pat Choate
criticizes Washington's "Revolving Door" of former U.S.
government officials who are subsequently hired as lobbyists
for foreign firms
:
These ex-officials are highly effective in representing
foreign clients because they possess a special, intimate
knowledge of the inside workings of America's trade,
investment, and related economic strategies. They also
have privileged access to friends, former colleagues, and




In regard to Japan, Choate points out numerous instances
where Japan's use of these officials has strongly influenced
the International Trade Commission (which serves in an
advisory capacity to the President and Congress), the U.S.












D. ROLE OF EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY
In addition to corporations, Japanese universities have
demonstrated similar exclusionary tactics vis-a-vis
foreigners. In 1985 only one American was employed as a
professor at a Japanese university, and attempts by others
were frustrated by a myriad of bureaucratic rigmarole. In
addition, repeated attempts by U.S. companies to participate
in Japanese research consortia have continually led to
refusal, or at best extremely limited research. In sharp
contrast is the degree of participation to which Japanese
corporations are involved in U.S. universities. Japan's
economic modus operandi has yielded them the profits whereby
they have bought their way into the U.S. industrial and
technological market. For example, at a cost of one million
dollars each, Japanese corporations have endowed nine chairs
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Under MIT's
industrial liaison program, the forty five participating
Japanese corporations (at a cost of thirty thousand dollars
per year) are permitted access to some of the best research in
the world." The issue of technology will be addressed in
the following chapter.
7:5 Pat Choate and J.K. Linger, The High Flex Society (New
York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1986), 112."
7Q Ibid. , 113 .
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E. OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Negotiations over the last few decades have yielded a
nominal opening of Japan's markets compared to its trading
partners. This has added to American frustrations that Japan
has continually utilized the free trade system to its own
advantage while granting few concessions of its own. In his
book, Head to Head
, Lester Thurow identifies the potential
conflict between Japan and its trading partners:
To grow faster than the rest of the world, Japan's export
industries had to capture larger and larger foreign market
shares to insure that Japan could pay for the raw-material
imports that it needed to keep its economy racing along.
The rest of the world could tolerate this situation as
long as Japan's exports were small. Japan is now so large
economically, however, that the rest of the world cannot
allow Japan's exports to rise and capture their markets at
the rate that would be required if Japan were to continue
to grow much faster than the rest of the world. The rest
of the world is simply going to stop Japan from being an
export-led economy in the twenty-first century, by
instituting overt restrictions if necessary.'50
The United States is faced with the dilemma of maintaining
a friendly relationship with Japan while attempting to resolve
a potentially volatile ' trade situation. Japan is equally
desirous of friendly relations and more so of U.S. presence
within the region--as discussed in the previous chapter--but
is fed up with the United States continually blaming Japan for
Lester Thurow, Head to Head (New York: William Morrow
and Company, Inc., 19 92), 249.
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what are America's own internal problems and inability to get
its own house in order. '-
Regarding trade issues with Japan, Edward J. Lincoln asks
"If Japan's trade behavior cannot be accepted as a natural
outcome of successful and benign industrial policies, then is
its behavior sufficiently at odds with international norms to
require some sort of special response from the United
States?"^ He goes on to address his question by proposing
that the United States should direct more attention toward the
current trade situation, but should not abandon the
fundamental principles of free trade as practiced by much of
the world. In attempting to resolve the trade problem with
Japan, U.S. policy must exercise continual pressure, "backed
by carefully calculated, realistic retaliation when faced with
intransigence, and grounded in a recognition that free trade
is desirable but sometimes impossible." 63 Clyde Prestowitz
takes a more pragmatic stand and proposes that the United
States "must begin to envision trade as an integral part of
American economic and national security policy and must move
away from the moralistic fair-unfair paradigm to a more
practical and inclusive position." 84 The future remains
81 Some of these grievances will be addressed in chapter
five
.
82 Lincoln, 137 .
83 Ibid. , 137 .
84 Prestowitz, 322-323.
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uncertain. The decline of the Japanese stock market that
started in 1990 will have a significant effect vis-a-vis
trade. On the positive side, the prediction that Japan's
Nikkei share average bottomed out in the Spring of 1992
resulted in individual investors and foreign fund managers
buying large sums of Japanese shares in April and May of
1992. o: Moreover, the decline in Japanese land and share
prices over the same period has gave foreign corporations a
better opportunity to enter the Japanese market. According to
the Japanese Ministry of Finance, foreign direct investment
increased 56 percent to 4.3 billion dollars in the year to
April 1992. ob Based on the assumption that more foreign
investment in Japan could eventually lead to more Japanese
imports (through foreign-owned related products and overseas
subsidiaries), this is indeed an avenue that should be
pursued. "If foreign investment does pick up in Japan, it
could do more to reduce the country's trade surplus than any
amount of bashing by Japan's trading partners." '
In an effort to break even during this period of economic
decline, some Japanese corporations are entering into a
retrenchment phase to reduce their costs by reducing capital
costs, making fewer products, and cutting working and overtime
85
"Earning Their Keep," The Economist , 13 June 1992, 90.
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hours.' For example, due to declining profits, Japan's auto
industry has reduced its aggregate investment by 12.5 percent;
and starting in April 1993 Toyota plans to reduce its capital
spending from an average of 500 billion yen over the past
three years to 350 billion." Other Japanese corporations in
the electronics, steel, and airline industries have taken
similar actions.''
Although this corporate retrenchment and decrease in
production could indicate fewer exports and a subsequent
reduction of the trade deficit, Japanese domestic demand has
also decreased, resulting in fewer imports. Statistics
indicate that the current U.S. trade deficit with Japan is
widening, and Japan's solution to its problems may be to
export its way out of its financial difficulties.'
Forecasts by McGraw-Hill indicate that after three years of
decline, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan is expected to rise
to 51 billion dollars by the end of 1992, up from 47 billion
dollars in 1991. ^ By May 1992, Japanese exports increased
eight percent from the previous year, while domestic demand
33
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reduced imports by five percent.' Moreover, at this pace
Japan's exports could account for approximately one half of
its GDP in 1992, taking its overall trade surplus no a record
100 billion dollars.' 4
With an emphasis on the economy in the 1992 U.S.
presidential election campaign, and the incoming Clinton
administration, it can be expected that trade issues will be
high on the agenda. Given the degree to which nations are
becoming more economically interdependent, it is essential
that the United States and Japan solve the existing trade
problems, hopefully without breeding feelings of antagonism or
bitterness. Japanese government projections indicate that by
the turn of the century, Japanese owned corporation in the
United States will account for one forth of all U.S. exports;
and the number of American employees working for these firms
will increase from 300,000 in 1992 to one million.''
The future holds some promise as the United States and
Japan have implemented additional measures to resolve the
trade dispute. In addition to negotiations through GATT and
the elimination of trade barriers through the Super 301
option, the United States and Japan have sought more
cooperative measures through the implementation of the
"How Japan Will Survive its Fall, " The Economist , June
1992, 65.
94 Ibid.
Funabashi, "Japan and America: Global Partners," 28.
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Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). The SII talks
established bilateral negotiations betv/een Japan and the
United States, allowing each side to present its complaints
about what it perceives to be the other side's structural
impediments to trade. Although the SII talks are still in the
early stages, some progress has been made as it provides a
positive and productive means of expressing each side's
hostilities. By early 1992 Japan had made strong commitments
to remove some of its trade barriers. Some of these
commitments include: enforcement of Japan's Anti-monopoly
Act, reformation of the land tax system, elimination of
waiting periods on foreign direct investment, and relaxation
of "fair competition" codes." The United States is also
making commitments in accordance with Japanese proposals, such
as attempting to lower the budget deficit and increasing the
savings rate. Time will tell whether or not both Japan and
the United States will honor their commitments to SII.
Recently some problems have arisen regarding follow-up
actions, and Japan has begun to question the United States'
commitment to the SII process. In August 1992 Japan
criticized the U.S. Congress for not taking legislative
action, as well as U.S. corporations' indifference in regard
to structural economic problems on the U.S. side.' "This
qb
"U.S. Trade Relations with Japan," 9
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attitude on the side of the United States will do little to
address trade imbalances between the two countries."" If
the SII is to succeed, it is necessary that the United States
demonstrate good faith in attempting to resolve its own
structural impediments.
Notwithstanding the occasional difficulties regarding
follow-up actions on the SII, it is important to note that the
SII talks have established a precedent whereby both countries
recognize the need for cooperation and communication and are
actively working to resolve the problem.
As the future of GATT remains uncertain, the United States
should prudently pursue alternative solutions such as the SII
and NAFTA. Regarding NAFTA, Japan's response is both
enthusiastic and cautious. "We welcome [the] positive aspects
of the NAFTA and hope that they will contribute to the
expansion of world trade. At the same time, however, we must
point out the negative aspects of the agreement which might
threaten the free trade system."' Japan's greatest concern
is that while Canada and Mexico will be able to import goods
to the United States with low tariffs, Asian nations will be
required to pay conventional tariffs.'1 Because of these
concerns, in addition to U.S. concerns about Asian countries
98 Ibid
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emulating Japan's discriminatory trade practices, it is
important that the United States and Japan pursue the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) approach. Moreover, APEC
would serve as a viable alternative to the East Asian Economic
Caucus, which would exclude the United States. Although still
in its early stages, APEC would comprise fifteen pan-Pacific
countries and regions, including Japan, the United States,
ASEAN countries, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea.'- APEC
would encourage the elimination of tariffs and investment
restrictions on a regional, multi-lateral scale. Moreover, it
would likely ease Japan's skepticism regarding NAFTA by
including it in an economic zone with the United States. A
Japanese official noted in August 1992, "Anticipating regional
unifications and formation of blocs in the United States and
Europe, such as the North American Free Trade Accord, Japan,
in particular, is reinforcing its policy of placing importance
on the APEC." 1 "- However, for APEC to succeed Japan must
first set the example for other regional nations by
alleviating its impediments to trade--taking action to
liberalize its trade practices and open its markets. 1 ''
On a broader scale, given the enormous U.S. federal
deficit and trade imbalance, the United States must come to
101 FBIS (12 August 1992): Annex, 3.
102 Ibid.
103 Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order,"
Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991/1992): 69.
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the realization, while options stiii remain, that foreign
policy in regard to economics and trade must ascend in
hierarchy and assume a higher priority. With the demise of a
communist Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, economics
and trade issues are coming to the forefront and restructuring
the definition of power. The United States needs to take
appropriate measures if it wishes to maintain its influential
power in the world. Internal improvements, such as
alleviating the ease with which former U.S. government
officials can sell their influence and expertise to foreign
competition, are measures the United States can take to get
its own house in order.
The shifting paradigm assigns more importance to the role
of economics, which makes it crucial for the United States to
recognize (like Japan has done) the importance of sustaining
some of its industries that are crucial to its National
Security. The United States has already done this in some
industries, such as aircraft and arms; however, the increasing
importance of technology and its role in the trade
relationship warrants more consideration. The importance of
technology will be discussed in the following chapter. The
greatest challenge, however, is to ensure survivability of
certain industries without being too protectionist and raising
neo-nationalist tensions on both sides of the Pacific.
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IV. THE U.S. TECHNOLOGY DRAIN
As trade problems continually plague the U.S. -Japan
relationship, the role of technology in this relationship is
increasingly being brought into question. Moreover, the
important role that technology plays in military capability
demonstrates its importance to a country's national security.
Cutbacks in the defense budget have reduced U.S. military
research and development. Consequently, the military must
increasingly rely on the commercial sector to provide its
state-of-the-art equipment. This could pose a problem if
commercial R&D and high-tech industries continually fall prey
to foreign competition.
Japanese acquisition of U. S . -developed technologies could
pose not only a problem to the ongoing trade deficit, but also
a serious threat to U.S. national security. An increasing
number of these supplies are coming from Japanese firms. In
a 1987 report published by the Defense Department, twenty one
critical U.S. weapons systems were dependent on foreign made,
primarily Japanese, semiconductors. Additionally, the United
States was also dependent on Japan as its sole supplier of
other critical military components such as microwave silicon
diodes for radar systems and ceramic packages protecting
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microchips from extremely hot temperatures.'1 ' 4 By 1990 Japan
was considered to be equal to, or ahead of, the United States
in eight of twenty critical technologies identified, including
semiconductors, machine intelligence and robotics, photonics,
superconductivity, and biotechnology materials.' In May
1991 the White House named 22 areas of technological
development that are "critical to the national prosperity and
to national security," including technologies such as
materials and manufacturing, microelectronics, biotechnology,
aeronautics, ceramics and composites, and high-definition
imaging and displays.'
Although turning to foreign suppliers may seem
economically feasible, it has serious implications, the most
crucial of which would hamper the United States' ability to
defend itself in a time of crisis. Additionally, the ability
of Japan to capitalize on this technology exacerbates the
ongoing trade deficit, resulting in the loss of millions of
jobs for U.S. employees and increased disharmony with Japan.
Given these circumstances, it is therefore prudent for trade
and national security purposes to ensure the survivability of
certain key industries so they do not fall prey to foreign
104
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dominance. William D. Phillips, associate director of the
White House Office of Science and Technology, and chairman of
the National Critical Technologies Panel noted in April 1991,
"We most recently have been reminded, by the spectacular
performance of U.S. coalition forces in the Persian Gulf, of
the crucial role that technology plays in military
competitiveness. It is equally clear that technology plays a




In an era where technologically advanced weaponry has been
the key to supersession, making previous generations of
weapons obsolete, it is of paramount importance to keep the
U.S. technological infrastructure secure. However, to do this
in the spirit of "lazzez faire" without being deemed too
protectionist or creating increased U.S. -Japan tensions
presents a dilemma for U.S. policymakers.
The use of semiconductors transcends much of the
technological industry, so this chapter will emphasize this
field. This chapter will focus on U.S. perceptions of the
technological relationship and attempt to analyze the
important role technology plays in not only the trade
relationship, but more important, the threat it poses to U.S.
national security.
107 Ibid. . .
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A. THE SEMICONDUCTOR TAKEOVER
The Japanese infiltration and eventual dominance of the
semiconductor industry is a classic example of Japan's ability
to obtain and exploit U . S . -developed technology. It is
worthwhile taking a closer look at the Japanese practices and
U.S. weaknesses that permitted Japan to control the
semiconductor industry.
The birth of the semiconductor age had its roots in 1948
when three American scientists from AT&T's Bell Laboratories
invented the transistor as the replacement for the vacuum
tube. The transistor was nearly a hundred times smaller than
the vacuum tube and much more efficient. AT&T was a
controlled monopoly in the years prior to deregulation, and
under the U.S. antitrust law it was required that they make
their technology available on the open market. Japan's Sony




The new semiconductor industry sparked intense competition
in the United States as some of the pioneers in the field
eventually broke off on their own to start businesses. Many
of these individuals set up shop in the central California
region, eventually known as Silicon Valley, which has become
the capital of the U.S. semiconductor industry. 1 oq
108 Prestowitz, 124.
10Q Roy Hofheinz Jr. and Kent Calder, The East Asia Edge
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As the United States dominated this field of technology,
Japan realized their deficiency in the area and took active
measures to protect their industries from the more capable and
less expensive American products. Whereas in the United
States the government played no role in promoting the industry
and abided by principles of competition and a free-market
economy, the Japanese government played a substantially
different role. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITT) instituted the Extraordinary Measures Law for
Promotion of the Electronics Industry in an effort to lessen
the gap with the U.S. industries. Under this law, measures
were taken to promote research in the field through providing
subsidies and government lending to selected Japanese
corporations, in addition to authorizing the creation of




On a broader scale, former Vice-Minister of MITI, Ichiro
Fujiwara spoke on Japan's national strategy:
Let's take the case of the mainframe computer as an
example. After the war, Japanese business firms had to
start from scratch. To survive, they had to struggle with
outmoded technology and meager capital to fend off foreign
competitors armed with computerized manufacturing systems
and management. No responsible government leaders, faced
with such a situation, would have sat on their hands and
watched domestic industries crushed under the juggernaut
Marie Anchordoguy, "The State and the Market:
Industrial Policy Towards Japan's Computer Industry," Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University, 1986, pp. 68-69. As cited
in Prestowitz, p. 129.
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of foreign competition. We had to help the domestic
computer industry to get on its feet. 111
MITI instituted a number of measures designed to boost its
lagging technological base while simultaneously hindering
specifically designated U.S. industries. MITI specifically
targeted IBM and in 1960 raised the computer tariffs. IBM
attempted to circumvent the tariff by manufacturing its
computers within Japan, but was only permitted to do so when
they agreed to license their patents to competing Japanese
manufacturers . llz
When IBM came out with its new 370 computer in the early
1970s, MITI realized that the key to technological superiority
rested in the semiconductor industry, and moved its focus to
semiconductor development. Additionally, tactics such as
dumping were used in the 1970s "to gain production experience"
in the semiconductor industry; however, the outcome of their




By 1980 Japan proved to the world it had taken the lead in
semiconductor development when the NTT corporation developed
the world's first 256K RAM. This was also significant in that
111 Ichiro Fujiwara, "Forced Changes," Business Tokyo ,
April 1987, 28. As cited in Thurow, Head to Head , 144.
112
"Managing MITI: Inside the Policy Process," April
1987, Business Tokyo , 22. As cited in Thurow, Head to Head ,
144.
113 Hofheinz and Calder, 181.
71
not only had Japan begun to take over the world market in the
RAM industry, subsequent developments in RAM-related
components led to a new generation of products which were
primarily Japanese dominated. In 1981, the U.S. semiconductor
industry produced 57 percent of the world market, and the
Japanese industry 33 percent. 114 By 1986 the Japanese world
market share rose to 65 percent while the American share
dropped to approximately 27 percent. 11 '1 Spending on R&D
reflected similar results. The Japanese routinely spent
approximately 12 percent of its sales on R&D, while the U.S.
semiconductor companies spent 8 percent. 116
How were the Japanese able to able to gain so much success
in the semiconductor market? Given the earlier success in the
United States, what pitfalls existed that allowed for a
relatively unrestricted Japanese takeover of the market?
Americans were innovative and dominated many world markets
by being first with new products. But the Japanese had
already found in the cases of radio, stereo, and
television that in the long run those advantages really
did not matter. The American technology could be obtained
rather easily. Its transfer could be made a condition for
access to the Japanese market. U.S. universities welcomed
foreign students. U.S. professional and industry
associations were open to foreign membership; and U.S.
companies, prevented by U.S. antitrust law from
114 Semiconductor Industry Association, The U.S. Crisis in
Microelectronics (San Jose, Calif.: Semiconductor Industry
Association, 1987), appendix A, exhibit II-6.
115 Prestowitz, 145.
U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Semiconductor
Dependency, p. 46.
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coordinating licensing activities among themselves, could
be played off against one another to extract technology
licenses. Moreover, they were often quick to license what
they called old technology, supremely confident that they
could always stay ahead. As a last resort, U.S. products
could also be copied. Once they had the technology, the
Japanese were confident that their great skill in refining
would enable them to take any U.S. product and make it
cheaper and better than the Americans could. 117
B. U.S. TECHNOLOGY DEPENDENCY AND THE NEED FOR A STRONG
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
The ability of the Japanese to obtain and exploit
technology, especially in the semiconductor industry has
generated rising concern over the implications this may bring
to U.S. national security. As stated in the introduction, the
United States relies solely on Japan for many of its military
components, many of them semiconductor related. Increasing
reliance on foreign-made critical components raises concerns
vis-a-vis U.S. military readiness in a crisis situation. It
is a compromise that has many Americans in the defense
industry uneasy, as they feel the United States has increased
its vulnerability and dependency on its allies (namely Japan)
whose loyalty could change in times of conflict.- This
feeling of vulnerability could likely breed further contempt
toward the Japanese.
n Prestowitz, 134.
118 Susumu Awanohara, "On the Defensive, " Far Eastern
Economic Review , 2 8 February 1991, 61.
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A less alarmist perspective is that although the U.S.
industries do not currently produce some of these components,
they maintain the capability for production in a crisis
situation. Although turning elsewhere for quick orders of
electronic components in a time of need may not appear as a
serious threat to U.S. national security, it does, however,
reveal areas of vulnerability in U.S. defense production. 110
Throughout the Gulf War, for example, the U.S. government
requested assistance from the Japanese Embassy in Washington
on numerous occasions when American manufacturers could not
produce enough critical components for video display terminals
required to analyze real-time intelligence information from
reconnaissance aircraft. 120 And more important, U.S. combat
troops were dependent on foreign suppliers (primarily
Japanese) for semiconductor chips, transistors used in "smart
bombs," and other components essential to their advanced
weapons . 121
In 1988 the Defense Science Board revealed that the U.S.
military was "dangerously dependent" on supplies from foreign
countries, and serious concern mounted as Congress's office of
Technology Assessment and the General Accounting Office both
119 Ibid.
120 Auerbach, 51
121 Awanohara, "On the Defensive, " 61
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agreed. 122 A senior administration official noted vis-a-vis
the Gulf War, "If foreign governments were neutral or were not
disposed to help us out, we could have run into some real
problems. We were sweating bullets over it and the military
was sweating bullets too." 1 -' 3
In May, 1991 the DOD made the following assessment in its
Critical Technologies Plan:
U.S. industry dominated the worldwide semiconductor
market from the late 1960s. Its leadership, however,
suffered a constant erosion by other industrialized
countries (primarily Japan) . In 1986, the U.S. lost world
market share leadership. Future trends indicate continued
market share declines. Closely coupled with this market
share decline is the decline of the semiconductor
materials and equipment industry that supports
semiconductor manufacturers. . . .While the United States has
lost its world manufacturing leadership position, it is
still generally recognized as the world technology leader.
However, since manufacturing, and ultimately sales,
generated the revenue for R&D, the future of U.S.
technology leadership is somewhat questionable. The
implications of the decline in technology and
manufacturing leadership for the DOD include the potential
for foreign dependence in this critical area and increase
the possibility that advanced microcircuit technology may
be made available to our potential adversaries.'^
In addition to the various technologies mentioned earlier,
the United States is also lagging behind in some of the newest
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Report on
Semiconductor Dependency, prepared by the Defense Science
Board Task Force (Washington, D.C., February 1987), 26.
123 Ibid
124 U.S. Department of Defense, Critical Technologies
Plan
,
prepared for the Committees on Armed Services United
States Congress, (Washington, D.C., 1 May, 1991), p. 1-15.
75
high-tech fields which could have military applications.
Take, for example one of the fastest growing high-tech areas,
the Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) industry. Although developed
by Europeans and Americans, the leadership in LCD technology
and production is now in Japan. LCDs provide a visual display
similar to that of a television, but due to their flat screen
and lighter weight, they are much more portable and especially
useful in aircraft and laptop computers . Japan took the lead
in this industry in the 1980s after both Europeans and
Americans were reluctant to make the investment and unable to
master the manufacturing. 1 ^'
The United States should be more vigilant in not allowing
itself to fall behind in these technologies of the future.
There are U.S. companies surviving in the LCD industry,
however, it has been difficult due to Japan's underpricing of
its products on the U.S. market. In 1990 U.S. LCD
manufacturers accused Japanese companies of dumping in the
United States. Washington agreed and imposed a 62 percent
tariff on Japanese LCD imports. 12b
Bob Johnstone, "Victory by Default," Far Eastern
Economic Review , 2 July 1992, 38.
126 Bob Johnstone, "Picture Power: Japan Will Dominate
Huge Market for Liquid Crystal Displays, " Far Eastern Economic
Review , 2 July 1992, 40.
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C. IS JAPAN RELIABLE?
Although the United States met little resistance from
Japan in obtaining needed war-time materials throughout the
Gulf War, it is important to note the implications and
possible threat to U.S. national security that exists. The
notorious Toshiba incident, in which a Toshiba subsidiary sold
submarine propeller milling machines to Russia, enabling them
to produce much quieter propellers, resulted in an enormous
setback for the U.S. Navy, and was a catalyst in fueling anti-
Japanese sentiment in the United States. 127
In 1986 a U.S. submarine in the North Atlantic, to its
surprise, found itself located via sonar interrogation by a
Soviet submarine. Given the advantage the United States held
in the area of submarine technology, how was it possible that
a Soviet sub could come so close totally undetected? The U.S.
subs had held considerable advantage over their Soviet
counterparts through amassing the distinctive sound signatures
of every Soviet sub known to the fleet.
The Toshiba Machine Corporation, in coordination with
Norway's Kongsberg Corporation, sold this state-of-the-art
milling equipment to the Soviets through fraudulent measures
and in violation of international laws; and although this was
done without prior knowledge of the Japanese government, it
127 Choate, Agents of Influence , 7
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raised serious concerns regarding the apparent impotence of
the government concerning critical security related exports.
D. ADDRESSING THE WEAKNESSES
Although the emergence of multi-national corporations,
increased trade and shared technology are positive factors in
a global and interdependent economy, the perception of
Japanese practices that contributed to U.S. feelings of
vulnerability has demonstrated the need for strengthening the
U.S. industrial and technological base in the interests of
national security. To do this the United States must start by
looking inward and address the major shortcomings within its
system that have allowed Japan to obtain the technological
edge
.
There are many contributing factors that have played to
Japan's advantage, from U.S. acquiescence during times of
prosperity, to the power of the Japanese lobbyists in
Washington. However, many of these theories of how Japan has
threatened the U.S. technological base center around Japanese
acquisition of U.S. companies, liaison with U.S. academic
institutions, and lack of a U.S. government policy.
A very successful method by which Japan has helped itself
to a piece of the American technological pie has simply been
through the purchase of U.S. companies. This problem is so
evident in the area of technology that the presence of
Japanese corporations in Silicon Valley is now commonplace.
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In the three year period prior to 1990, Japanese investors
contributed over $650 million into minority positions in 120
smaller technology related businesses; and on a larger scale
the U.S. electronics producer, Gould, was purchased by Japan's
Nippon Mining for 1.1 billion dollars; and for 309 million
dollars Hitachi bought 80 percent of National Advanced
Systems, its U.S. mainframe distributor. 128
The penetration of Japan into the technological arena
through the purchase of American companies, especially
throughout the 1980s, has generated concerns in regard to the
U.S. technological base. Why, therefore, do the U.S.
corporations appear to have been selling out to their Japanese
competitors?
Part of the problem stems from an apparent lack of
interest from U.S. investors, coupled with well-funded
Japanese corporations anxious to get their hands on U.S.-
developed technology. This is frequently the case with many
of the smaller start-up industries. Take, for example, Menlo
Technologies in San Jose,' California. In the late 1980s Menlo
Technologies sought initial funding from U.S. venture
capitalists. The venture capitalists offered two million
dollars for an 80 percent stake. Japan's Nippon Mining, on
the other hand, was looking for an opportunity to enter the
electronics industry, and gladly paid two million dollars for
128
"Is the U.S. Selling its High-Tech Soul to Japan?"
Business Week, 26 June 1989, 117.
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a 30 percent stake. 1 ""' Additionally, Menlo was given the use
of Japanese engineers and plants in exchange for its marketing
and manufacturing rights. Everyone is happy, Menlo
Technologies gets the funding it needs and a Japanese company
gets the technology it desires.
In yet another example, Kubota Ltd., a Japanese
manufacturer of agricultural equipment, was eager to enter
into the computer industry and quickly purchased five U.S.
companies specializing in supercomputer technology. One U.S.
company, Ardent Computer Inc, was paid $69 million for a 44
percent stake of the mmisupercomputer maker. Included in the
purchase were the rights to share its technologies and
manufacture its designs. 130 In less than two years after its
first U.S. purchase, Kubota Ltd. was independently
manufacturing its own minisupercomputers
.
With the ongoing Japanese purchasing share in the U.S.
market there are growing fears that Japan will soon dominate
other high-tech industries unless measures are taken to
reverse this trend. This problem was so apparent in 1989 that
the vice-president of Asian operations in the American
Electronics Association's Tokyo office stated, "Japanese
investment is used as a vacuum cleaner for acquiring
technology and porting it home. If America intends to win the
129 Ibid. , 11;
130 Ibid.
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race based on innovation, it must stop selling its running
shoes to the competitors." 131
Notwithstanding Japan's economic slowdown in the early
1990s which could lessen its foreign purchases, for the future
it is necessary to look at the internal causes in the United
States that made its corporations easy prey. Two reasons can
be attributed to the problem. First; the United States lacked
adequate safeguards in the 1970s and early 1980s against the
liberal outflow of U.S. technology. And second; due to the
high-tech industrial boom, profits have not been as high as
they once were, and U.S. investors are reluctant to sink their
dollars into the business. 13 " Some critics might call this
nearsightedness on the part of the U.S. investors who are
concerned only with short-term profit, and that Japanese
buyers exercise more patience and are investing in the long
run. More realistically, however, is that investment
practices, protectionism, and government backing in Japan
significantly reduces the risk of long term investment, giving
them an advantage over their U.S. counterparts. Most
shareholders in Japanese corporations are members of other
related corporations, and long term investment decisions are
made based on the long-term survivability of the entire
industry. The risk of the investment and capital costs is
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
subsequently reduced by the composite structure of the
133group
.
In the United States, on the other hand, the primary
source of capital comes from Wall Street. If a U.S. company
finds its profits dropping below expectations, the price of
their shares will decrease, which consequently increases the
cost of their capital, and decreases their ability to fend off
foreign investment when in dire financial straits. Foreign
investors suddenly become more attractive to the struggling
American corporations.
Another advantage that the Japanese corporations have over
their U.S. counterparts is the government sponsored
protectionist practices. By restricting foreign investment
into the market or implementing measures that make foreign
investment difficult assures Japanese corporations of
continued production through a wide distribution of products
within Japan's domestic marketplace. Japanese corporations in
search of foreign investment or multi-national business can
therefore afford to be more patient, and the more vulnerable
American corporations make attractive, easily acquired
targets
.
As a result, many of the sub-industries that provide
components to the larger ones are also falling under Japanese
leadership, such as polycrystals , which are key components
Prestowitz, 361
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used in semiconductors. A Japan consultant for Dataquest
Inc., a market researcher, noted, "We're losing the whole food
chain of supporting technologies."-
In addition to purchasing U.S. corporations, Japan has
also been successful at obtaining the fruits of the state-of-
the-art developments at U.S. academic institutions. Japan has
effectively bought its way into the U.S. industrial and
technological market
. In sharp contrast is the degree of
participation to which U.S. corporations are involved in
Japanese universities. In 1985 only one American was employed
as a professor at a Japanese university, and attempts by
others were frustrated by a myriad of bureaucratic rigmarole,
and repeated attempts by U.S. companies to participate in
Japanese research consortia have continually led to refusal,
or at best extremely limited research. 13 -
Japan's success with regard to U.S. academic institutions
has been in the area of funding. On numerous occasions
Japanese corporations have pumped millions of dollars into
research projects conducted at U.S. universities, and in
return receive first shot at licensing any new technology that
may result. "Nearly every major Japanese corporation—from
NTT to Sony, Mitsui, and Toyota--is funding research at one or
more American campuses. The Japanese are deeply involved in
:i4
"Is the U.S. Selling its High-Tech Soul to Japan?"
117
.
13 "' Choate and Linger, 112
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virtually every aspect of U.S. technology, from the
development of advanced computers at Stanford University to
diesel engine design at Princeton University. The roster of
R&D supporters at some of the major American universities
reads like a who's who of Japanese industry." 136
Throughout the 1980s many U.S. colleges and universities
sought out Japan as a major market for funding and licensing
of technology, especially at times when federal funding and
interest by U.S. corporations was scarce. Japan was the first
place MIT's media lab sought out for sponsorship, which by
1984 was providing approximately $500,000 a year (25 percent
of its total funding) from corporations such as Toshiba,
Sanyo, and NEC. 1 '' In addition, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, at a cost of one million dollars each Japanese
corporations have endowed up to sixteen chairs at MIT. Under
MIT's industrial liaison program, the forty five participating
Japanese corporations (at a cost of thirty thousand dollars
per year) are permitted access to some of the best research in
the world. 1 Under their research contract the Japanese
corporations are granted royalty-free, unlimited access to
any new developments resulting from the consortia, frequently
"Japan is Buying its Way into U.S. University Labs,"
Business Week , 24 September 1984, 72.
137 Ibid. , 73.
138
"Japan 2000, " 113 .
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before any of these development are published in U.S.
technical journals.
Some schools have gone as far as forming partnerships with
Japanese corporations in exchange for a percentage of the
royalties. At Georgia Institute of Technology a partnership
was formed with a Japanese trading house to market its patents
to Japanese corporations, which gives the trading house
exclusive rights to the school's technology in Japan, in
exchange for a 10 percent share of royalties. 1 It's a
matter of survival. "Our institutions have resources, and if
they are not tapped by our own companies, those in Japan are
going to take advantage of the opportunities," says Andrew A.
Frank, professor of electrical engineering at the University
of Wisconsin. 140 Frank's research on continuously variable
transmissions was rescued by a Japanese automotive supplier
with a one million dollar grant when his research was
jeopardized by a shortage of funds at the Energy Department,
and no American auto makers were interested. 141 Situations
such as this provide attractive opportunities to Japanese
corporations, intensifying their interest in U.S. universities
studying fields such as electronics, ceramics, and lasers.
139
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Foreign access to R&D in American universities was cause
for debate in 1991. The controversy centered around academic
institutions, supported by tax dollars and federal grants,
selling access to, and patents on, research to foreign
corporations. Critics argue that these institutions should be
managed to improve U.S. economic competitiveness. 14 "
Japanese interest and dependence on U.S. universities
continues in the 1990s, however, it is worth noting that there
is a lack of interest by U.S. researchers in Japan's
universities due to lack of technological advancement. 143
John M. Deutch, Institute Professor at MIT, and former Provost
and Dean of Science, stated in November 1991:
Because the Japanese depend on access to U.S. technology
in general and U.S. universities in particular to maintain
their pace of innovation, some have proposed that the
United States insist on reciprocity--that is, that U.S.
companies be granted similar access to Japanese
technology. But such reciprocity is unlikely to work.
The Japanese want access to U.S. universities, but there
is no equivalent interest among U.S. researchers in
Japanese universities. 144
E. OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The dependence of the U.S. military on foreign,
particularly Japanese, components raises serious concerns
John Deutch, "The Foreign Policy of U.S.
Universities," Science
,
2 August 1991, 492.
143 John M. Deutch, "The U.S. Edge Over Japan, " Technology
Review , 94, no. 8 (November /December 1991) : 73.
144 Ibid.
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regarding the stability of U.S. national security and
intensifies frictions in the U.S. -Japan relationship. This
dependence has largely been due to the ease with which U.S.
technology is obtained abroad and subsequently exploited. The
U.S. military is becoming increasingly dependent upon the
commercial sector for its technology; and this trend can be
expected to continue due the decrease in defense expenditures
as a result of the diminished Soviet threat . Increased
importance, however, must be given to the role the commercial
sector in the national security of the United States.
Starting with the post-World War II reconstruction of
Japan, the United States provided virtually unlimited access
to the Japanese in the field of technology and research and
development. Moreover, Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry was requiring foreign firms such as IBM and
Texas Instruments to license their technology to Japanese
competitors before allowing them to manufacture in Japan. 14 "'
Japan, however, is extremely reluctant to provide
technological information or research and development to
countries hosting Japanese corporations. For example, in the
late 1980s a Japanese plant located in the United States
denied any American attempt to access its technology on
ceramic semi-conductors by denying employment to U.S.
engineers. Despite the cost-effectiveness of hiring from
4
" Hofheinz and Calder, 149
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within the United States, they chose to deny American access
and import their own engineers from Japan. 146
In sum, from a U.S. perspective the Japanese have been
gathering the fruits of the technological and research efforts
and applying it to their own industries and trade markets.
This has resulted in a drain of U.S. technology and
contributed to the diminished leadership within the field as
well, while simultaneously shutting out the United States to
Japanese technological advances
.
To maintain the survivability of those industries critical
to national security the United States needs to take a page
from the Japanese book and lessen their industries' dependence
on the U.S. military and increase R&D and sales applicable to
commercial use. "The solution is to recognize that, in a
world of imperfect markets, leadership in the industries
confers economic as well as strategic benefits." 14 Many of
these critical industries depend heavily on the military for
sales and profits. Through the employment of dual-use
technologies applied to the commercial sector, these
industries would find a whole new market to supply. This
would lower production costs and increase profits,





In regard to regaining the semiconductor industry, the
Defense Department has established Sematech. As a result of
the findings by the Defense Science Board, the Defense
Department invested 600 million dollars over a six year
period. Sematech involves a combined business-government
effort including fourteen U.S. companies--led by IBM--hoping
to stage a comeback in the semiconductor industry. 4 " The
combined effort concentrates on developing prototype
production lines that would enable U.S. industries to catch up
with Japan in the manufacturing of semiconductors. This is a
step in the right direction and has already demonstrated its
effectiveness. By November 1992 the United States had
decreased the manufacturing gap with Japan in the
semiconductor industry, and was predicted to soon regain the
global lead. Analysts predict that semiconductor corporations
in the United States will control 25 billion dollars of the 60
billion dollar international semiconductor market within a




l'f the United States wishes to regain
or maintain leadership in other areas as well, more programs
of this nature need to be established.
Catherine Morrison and Meredith Whiting, eds
.
,
Managing Critical Technologies: What Should The Federal Role
Be?
, (Washington, D.C.: The Conference Board, Inc.), 1990. 2.
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A forum conducted by The Conference Board, an organization
consisting of senior business leaders, academicians and
government agencies, addressed the U.S. technology problem
and noted the following:
There is virtually no disagreement that certain basic
technologies are vital to American economic and military
security. Describing these technologies with great
precision is a bit more difficult, but leading strategists
identify electronic circuitry and components and materials
technologies, along with advanced biogenetic engineering,
as areas in which the United States must be certain of its
leadership .... There is also no disagreement that the
United States must take all those steps within its
national power to assure its independence in these fields.
The Department of Defense cannot be dependent on foreign
producers for the components or circuitry necessary to
guide our nation's weapons systems. Nor can it rely on
economic competitors to provide the necessary high
performance materials . ir ''
A change in strategy, perhaps taking the form of an
industrial policy, is a possible solution. A stronger
marriage between academic institutions, the government, and
U.S. corporations— emphasizing R&D and liaison programs--is
essential if the United States is to remain a militarily and
technologically strong country. If the military is going to
depend on the commercial sector, we must take active measures
to ensure the survivability of them and lessen their
vulnerability
.
Even some of America's strongest industries are being
threatened. The U.S. aerospace industries have previously
17,0 Ibid., 3
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done well, in part due to government contracts for military
aircraft. However, companies such as Boeing and McDonnel
Douglas are losing contracts in the commercial sector to
Airbus, the European consortium that receives governmental aid
from France, Britain Germany and Spain. 11" 1
Having watched the United States lose leadership positions
in automobiles, consumer electronics and other fields,
many elected officials and others now say the country must
make a stand in aerospace while Boeing is still on
top. . . . [A]erospace should serve as a rallying point for a
national industrial policy, the ideologically charged
concept that Washington should explicitly support those
industries whose continued competitiveness is considered
crucial to the nation's future. 1 -"1
Moving toward an industrial policy may require a shift in
the method of conducting R&D. Lester Thurow notes that
empirical studies have demonstrated that the social rate of




Those who invest in private R&D also want a monopoly on
their ideas, so that they can earn the largest possible
rate of return on their investments. To encourage R&D
investment, monopolistic patent rights are given. Yet any
society is much better off if the ideas developed within
its jurisdictions are diffused to every producer as fast
as possible. What is needed to stimulate R&D investments
(patents) reduces their payoff (diffusion). Joint, partly
government financed, cooperative R&D projects such as
those found in the Japanese Key Technologies Center are
151 Richard W. Stevenson, "U.S. "Aerospace Industry Sees








In this case, the United States has something to gain from
copying certain Japanese practices. Although it might
preclude Japan from obtaining specific U. S . -developed
technologies, Japan would not have cause to protest for
policies Japan itself practices. However, the strengthening
of U.S. industries should be done in the interest of free
trade with measures short of being deemed "protectionist".
Given the current trade situation, is the American
technology drain and dependence on Japanese products destined
to further deteriorate the relationship between the two
countries? How serious a threat does this pose to U.S.
national security? There are no easy answers to these
questions. The trade/technology-related tensions that exist
between the two nations demonstrates the need for a viable
solution. Given the power and responsibility both countries
hold in regard to economic and world stability, it is
essential to resolve these problems with an attitude of
fairness and cooperation.
On a broader scale, perhaps its time to reevaluate the
U.S. -Japan relationship based on the realities of the post-
Cold War era. The subordinate role that Japan has assumed for
the last 40 years is no longer valid given the fall of
154 Ibid
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Communism and an economically sound Japan. Encouraging Japan
to assume greater responsibility both in the region and
throughout the world could alleviate the current "big
brother /little brother" perceptions that are based on the
defunct Cold War philosophy. Moreover, Japan would have to
assume greater financial responsibility throughout the world
and realize that its practices must fall in line with more
globally accepted norms. If not, as Lester Thurow alluded to
in Chapter III, the rest of the world will simply not tolerate







V. JAPAN: A CLOSER LOOK
...The danger is that a growing nationalist chorus of
trade-related demands in the United States, legitimized
and encouraged by revisionist thinking, will feed Japanese
neonationalism and vice-versa--in the end derailing U.S.-
Japanese relations and delivering a fatal blow to an




As trade and technology problems continue with the United
States, there is a growing mobilization of Japanese opinion
that is less willing to tolerate and submit to U.S. pressure.
As Japan's self confidence and nationalist sentiment
increases, its behavior can be expected to be more assertive.
A Harris Poll conducted in Japan in 1989 revealed the
following : 1C/
-41% felt little fondness or admiration for America as a
nation, and 45% toward the American people.
-U.S. companies are not trying hard enough vis-a-vis
exports to Japan (52%) , and the U.S. is unfairly pressuring
Japan on trade issues (57%) .
-the U.S. growing dependence on Japanese technology gives
Japan more clout in dealing with the U.S. (55%)
-America's problems stem from too many minorities (42%) .
Tsurumi , 4
.
"Japan's Hardening View of America, " Business Week , H
December 1989, 62-64.
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This, however is not to say that all of Japan is
mobilizing against the United States. For example, the same
study revealed that 55% felt Japan imposes unfair trade
restrictions, and 62% felt Japan could be more flexible on
trade issues
.
Japanese frustration with Americans grows when it seems,
no matter what their actions or capitulations, they are still
accused of having ulterior motives. For example, public U.S.
officials such as mayors or governors negotiate with Japanese
companies to convince them to open factories and plants in
U.S. communities to boost employment. However, once these
factories are established, they are suddenly viewed as a
threat;" attempting to sell its products in the United
States and avoid import tariffs, as well as trying to steal
U.S. technology.
Moreover, U.S. allegations and continual pressure are
occurring at a time when Japan feels it is making great
improvements in opening up its markets, loosening strict
government control, and working toward a better, less work-
oriented way of life for its citizens. Too much pressure from
the United States could reach a boiling point among the
Japanese that could lend credibility to the right wing
Japanese neo-nationalists . As these troublesome issues over
trade and technology transfer appear to be increasing--coupled
15£ Romberg and Yamamoto, 12
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with a rise in Japanese national ism- -the potential to injure
the U.S. -Japan relationship clearly exists. A rise in
Japanese neo-nationalism is manifested in The Japan That Can
Say No by right wing Diet Member Shintaro Ishihara, in which
he accuses Americans of being racists and lazy, and brags
about Japan's technological superiority. 1 ^ Although many
Japanese would dismiss Ishihara ' s perspectives as extreme,
some of his views could take hold. This chapter will focus on
gaining a better understanding of the Japanese mindset.
Moreover, it will focus on Japanese perspectives regarding the
United States. These steps are necessary if both countries
wish to successfully resolve their differences.
A. LOYALTY AND THE JAPANESE WORK ETHIC
Much of Japan's success since World War II has resulted
from the strong individual work ethic that has evolved
throughout the centuries and distinguished the Japanese from
many other cultures. In an effort to maintain favorable
relationships and hope to resolve existing U.S. and Japanese
economic/ trade-related problems , it is important to understand
the factors that have nurtured the Japanese work ethic, which
has contributed to Japan's strong sense of loyalty and
nationalism.
Ishihara Shintaro, The Japan That Can Say No (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).
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One of the primary factors that helped shaped the Japanese
mindset is the influence of Confucianism, and its integration
into Japanese society. Confucianism took on a different
appearance as it was introduced to Japan. Whereas Chinese
Confucianism placed a strong emphasis on benevolence, Japanese
Confucianism discarded it and instead placed a special
emphasis on loyalty. 1 The Confucianist-style reforms
implemented under Prince Shotoku in the late sixth and early
seventh centuries played a major role in framing the early
Japanese mindset. He undertook a number of actions such as
centralization of government, emphasizing imperial supremacy,
and stressing a bureaucracy of merit in an effort to model the
Japanese government after China. One of Prince Shotoku 's most
notable contributions which helped to nurture the Japanese
ideals of loyalty, determination and hard work was his
"Seventeen Article Constitution". 161 Many of these articles
stressed the importance of harmony, loyalty and hard work, and
through its implementation had a significant impact on the
Japanese society.
The strong ethical code of the warriors was developed
during the Kamakura period (1185-1333). Strong emphasis was
placed on frugality, horsemanship, martial arts,
1 Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan 'Succeeded' ? Western
Technology and the Japanese Ethos (New York: Cambridge





swordsmanship, bravery and hard work. This aristocratic
warrior class eventually became known as the bushi (warrior)
or samurai (retainer) class. The Samurai class took on the
responsibility of assuming greater power as they integrated
into positions of economic and political authority. The
extent of the commitment of warrior loyalty was manifested in
the common practice of suicide in the form of seppuku
(disembowelment ) , also known as harakiri (belly slitting)
which became glorified during this period.
During the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), to ensure loyalty
of the Daimyo to the Shogunate, the Tokugawa often attempted
to link themselves with the Daimyo families through marriage.
This was not always possible, however, and their most
effective method of ensuring loyalty was through the "hostage"
system. The "hostage" system required that the Daimyo send
their wives to Edo as hostages to ensure their cooperation and
loyalty to the Shogunate.
The socialization process throughout the Tokugawa period,
especially within the family, was instrumental in the
development of the earlier Japanese concepts of discipline and
hard work. Children were expected to uphold rather rigorous
standards from an early age. In addition to the Confucian
ideals that were impressed upon an individual early in his
life, Japanese parents instilled in their children (and
strongly enforced) disciplines such as conformity and respect.
As the individual grew older he was increasingly expected to
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uphold higher standards of conformity in preparation for his
adult life.
Probably the strongest motivational force that kept the
individual within these standards of conformity, and has been
prevalent even in modern times, was the fear of rej ection
.
lbZ
According to Robert N. Bellah in his book Tokuqawa Religion
,
"The basic psychological pressure was the threat of rejection
symbolized most pointedly, perhaps, by disinheritance. To be
cast adrift without the support of relatives in a society such
as the Japanese was indeed the worst of all
possibilities." 1 " The fear of rejection in Japan even in
the 20th century continues to be one of the strongest
motivational factors for loyalty and conformity in the
workplace. An individual who proves unworthy in, or is
shunned from, his place of employment oftentimes experiences
devastating feelings of rejection.
The Meiji restoration in 1868 saw Japan adopt bold new
attitudes in creating a new centralized administration. The
government placed strong emphasis on national, rather than
individual wealth, in an effort to build a modern,
industrialized nation. This had far-reaching effects on the
Japanese sense of nationalism that is evident even in modern
times
.
162 Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion ( Boston: Beacon
Press, 1957) , 35.
163 Ibid.
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In its attempt to construct a modern government, the Meiji
government realized that it lacked the managerial and lower
level labor resources that were required to develop its modern
enterprises. The government subsequently realized that the
unemployed Samurai warriors (who had been stripped of their
occupation) , with their loyalty and dedication to hard work,
were well suited for these positions. The Samurai class
integrated well into the government system in addition to the
giant financial cliques or Zaibatsu
,
the giant Japanese
corporations that emerged during Japan's industrialization
process in the later 1800s. This new generation of Samurai
employees took great pride in their contributions to the
state, which eventually resulted in a strong sense of
nationalistic pride that developed throughout the country.
The Meiji government was faced with the dilemma of
developing the same type of loyalty and pride in its employees
outside the ranks of the Samurai, and discovered that the
solution centered around the creation of a new, modernized
system of education combining western knowledge, Confucian
beliefs and loyalty to the state. From 1890 further efforts
to integrate Confucian values and state loyalty were
implemented with the Imperial Rescript on Education issued by




The seniority wage system was instituted during the Meiji
Period. Under this system of lifetime employment, workers
frequently were required to perform many different types of
work within the company based on the needs of the company.
Oftentimes the individual had very little choice in the
specific task or trade he was expected to perform. This
differs considerably from practices in many western countries,
where the performance of ones specific skill nurtures a
certain degree of satisfaction and oftentimes reflects the
degree of success of ones career. Under the Meiji system, job
security was not necessarily as dependant upon one particular
skill, but rather upon devotion and dedication to the company
for whom they worked. Loyalty became without a doubt a key
factor contributing to one's success within his place of
employment
.
Loyalty and dedication continued as Japan became more
imperialist in the early the late 19th and early 20th century.
The dedication of the Japanese soldiers were exemplified in
Japan's victory over China in 1895 and over Russia in 1905.
However, the most extreme acts of loyalty and dedication were
manifested during World War II with Japan's "Kamikaze"
suicide planes, which were responsible for sinking 34 ships
and causing damage to 3 68 more. lbS
ib c Fairbank, 814.
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The post-war U.S. Occupation saw an unexpected openness
within Japan to adapt from a militaristic society into a
democratic one. They found the American occupation to be
better than expected. "The Japanese expected a cruel and
harsh occupation but found a benevolent one. They feared a
vindictive rule but found a constructive one. Under these
conditions, the sense of duty that had enabled them to bear
the sacrifices of war turned to positive, and at times even
enthusiastic, cooperation with the new authorities." 1 '"
The American occupation was also responsible for relieving
from employment around 200,000 politicians, military officers,
and businessmen who played crucial roles in Japan's
contribution to the war. Subsequently, with regard to the
workplace, a new breed of leadership emerged within the
corporations. Many of these replacements had extensive
military experience, and brought with them into the workplace
additional concepts of loyalty nurtured throughout their
military career. These managers with former military
experience were able to transcend the spirit of unity and
cohesiveness by managing their employees in the same way they
managed their troops. Now more than ever, dedication and
loyalty to the company was paramount, and was regarded as the
highest virtue. This "esprit de corp" nurtured a special
relationship between management and the laborers that was not
16b Ibid., 817.
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evident in the earlier Zaibatsu enterprises, and sparked a new
sense of nationalism.
The strong sense of loyalty that has been so inherent to
Japanese culture is evident in modern times. This prevailing
sense of loyalty is an underlying factor that contributes to
the low rates of absenteeism and relatively few union
disputes. Subsequently, the employee is justly rewarded for
his efforts. In addition to the incentives such as the
lifetime employment system offered by the larger corporations,
the employer's appreciation is also demonstrated through other
benefits such as housing, maternity and hospital benefits,
monetary gifts for occasions such as marriage, birth or death,
and nursery services for children. 1 ''
Another example of loyalty evident today has been the
dedication to self discipline, also known as Gaman . It is a
term used to explain the Japanese perseverance and dedication
brought about by long work hours at intensive output levels.
The principle on which Gaman is based most likely accounts for
the high use of amphetamines and caffeine based drinks much
more frequently than barbiturates. 168
The strong Japanese concept of loyalty and nationalism
nurtured throughout the years, in addition to Japan's
seclusiveness as an island nation, has given rise to a work
167 Radha Sinha, Japan's Options for the 1980 's (New York
St. Martin's Press, 1982), 9.
168
"Japan 2000, " 54.
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ethic that vehemently disregards the "undesirables, " or anyone
not conforming to mainstream Japanese ideals. 1 '" Japanese
characterization of people residing in Japan as "insiders" or
"outsiders" continues to be the norm. 170 This partially
explains why, even in modern times, foreign integration be it
social, professional, or business-related, is frequently
difficult. For example, foreigners taking residence in Japan
are required to be fingerprinted to allow the government to
follow their activities; and in regard to the job market, non-
mainstream Japanese and foreigners are more likely to




Another issue that bears consideration is that the
Japanese concept of loyalty is so pointed that it is at times
unchecked, and is not dependent on the concept of right or
wrong. Their goal-oriented society is totally focused on
completion of the task at hand, fair or unfair. Chie Nakane,
a professor at Tokyo University and well known anthropologist,
stated in the Fall of 19'91, "We Japanese have no principles.
Some people think we hide our intentions, but we have no
intentions to hide. . . .We have no dogma and don't ourselves
know where we are going. This is a risky situation, for if
lbq Ibid. , 50.
Romberg and Yamamoto, 5
171 Ibid.
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someone is able to mobilize this population in a certain
direction, we have no checking mechanism." 172 With the above
in mind, the United States should continue to put pressure on
Japan to bring its practices more into the mainstream;
however, to do this without provoking too much friction may be
difficult .
B. NATIONALISM AND JAPANESE UNIQUENESS
Chapter III briefly described the problems brought about
by Japanese feelings of uniqueness. In many respects this has
been a major stumbling block for Japan, especially in recent
times when its economy is moving toward globalization and
interdependence. Strong national pride, racial prejudices and
isolationism have contributed to Japan's inability to identify
with the rest of the world. These factors are intensified as
Japan's economic success calls for increased responsibility to
the world outside of Japan's boarders that in some cases
conflicts with Japan's national interests.
Japan's sense of uniqueness can be traced to its long
history of isolation and geographic boundaries as an island
nation. While other nations may perceive Japan as an
exclusive nation borne of racial prejudices, Japan views the
distinction based on a combination of factors including
nation, language, race and culture. "Because the Japanese
:_
- Tamamoto, 5 84.
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have merged their feelings about race, culture, and nation
together, they have probably made their attitudes toward race
all the stronger. It is almost as if they regard themselves
as a different species from the rest of humanity."' Not
only are Japanese attitudes biased against Blacks and
Caucasians, but also against non-Japanese Asians, such as
Koreans and Chinese, who encounter extreme difficulty when
attempting to gain Japanese citizenship, cultural acceptance,
or enter into mixed marriages. Post-Second World War
attitudes in the United States and Europe, on the other hand,
have been more tolerant and accepting of racial diversity.
Modern Japanese nationalism stems from Japan's transition
from an inferior, broken nation in the aftermath of World War
II to its rise in recent decades to an economic superpower.
Extreme dedication, effort, and nationalistic loyalty were
required within Japan for it to rise to its current status.
The United States has played a major role in the
rehabilitation of Japan. However, forty years after the
occupation ended, the United States continues to play the role
of "big brother" . The appearance of books such as The Japan
That Can Say No is an indication of a change in Japanese
perceptions toward the United States. Sodei Rinjiro, a
professor of politics and history at Hosei University in Tokyo
noted in late 1991:
Reischauer, Change and Continuity , 395
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In this age of telecommunications, the United States
can no longer pose as the shining role model that Japan so
avidly began following some 45 years ago. Now everyone in
Japan is exposed to all the social problems that the
United States cannot handle--crime, drugs, the homeless,
to name a few. The economic situation also has changed--
almost reversed. Japan is now the world's largest
creditor nation whereas the former richest and most
powerful nation has become a debtor. The way the Japanese
see it, the United States has lost its prestigious
position as world leader. The more demands the United
States makes of Japan, most of which seem unreasonable to




Japanese are proud of, and at times arrogant about their
accomplishments, and attribute their success to Japan's
nationalistic fervor. "[Nationalism] has at times carried the
Japanese in swings from an inferiority complex to the
dangerously euphoric excesses of a superiority complex, as
happened in the disaster of World War II. It has also
strengthened Japanese feelings of being separate from the rest
of the world and encouraged fears that too much borrowing from
other countries or even contact with them might somehow rob
Japanese of their Japaneseness . " 1?r
The above attitudes regarding race and nationalism are
also characterized in the trade relationship between Japan and
its trading partners, who view Japan as operating on a double
standard. While other nations are more accepting of Japanese
businesses and influence within their boarders, Japan's sense
174 Sodei Rinjiro, "No More Pearl Harbors," Japan





of purity and exclusion, coupled with pervasive mistrust, has
all too often resulted in its inability to accept any foreign
influence within its borders that might taint its racial and
cultural integrity. The relative homogeneity of Japan's
population and lack of any large minority groups has led to
fundamental perceptual differences between Japan and many of
its trading partners. This is exemplified by the occasional,
somewhat insensitive, statements by Japanese politicians and
leaders who have failed to fully comprehend the role and
importance of ethnic and racial minorities in the United
States, and the discriminatory hiring practices of U.S. -based
Japanese companies which stem from their own racial and
nationalistic perceptions. To them, these are not racist
attitudes, but only a natural product of the Japanese
socialization process.
C. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN WORKERS
A prevailing belief in Japan attributes U.S.
trade/ technology problems to the "laziness" of its work force,
resulting in the inability of Americans to compete with the
Japanese. In January 1992 Speaker of Japan's Lower House of
Parliament, Yoshio Sakurauchi , noted that "The source of the
problem is the inferior quality of U.S. labor. U.S. workers
are too lazy. They want high pay without working." 1.
: David E. Sanger, "A top Japanese politician Calls U.S
Work Force Lazy," New York Times , 21 January 1992, C1,C6.
108
Statements such as the above are reflective of reports in the
Japanese media and by some Japanese politicians portraying the
U.S. worker as substandard to the Japanese worker, resulting
in substandard workmanship. Ishihara Shintaro blames the
"shoddy workmanship" of the Boeing Company employers for the
1985 crash of a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 Jumbo Jet in Gumma
Prefecture where 520 people died. Boeing had previously noted
that there were shortcomings in its blue-collar personnel that
were being rectified. After the crash a Japanese police
report indicated that four Boeing employees failed to properly
repair a previous problem with the tail assembly, consequently
leading to the crash. "Five hundred twenty people died
because Boeing workers were so incompetent or careless that
they could not securely fasten a three-ply bulkhead. Such
shoddy performance by a Japanese corporation is
unthinkable. " 178
In another example of alleged poor workmanship, Ishihara
maintains that U.S. problems in the semiconductor industry
stem from their high defect rate, which although improving,
was five to six times higher than the Japanese defect rate.
United States demands for Japan to purchase more U.S.
manufactured semiconductors resulted in Japanese complaints of
poor quality. The American executives countered, saying the
Ishihara Shintaro, 38-39
178 Ibid. , 39.
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Japanese were the only ones complaining. "The implication was
that our companies were somehow wrong for insisting on
quality. That response makes me wonder if the United States
is not finished as a great country. " 17q
On the contrary, however, is a 1992 study of worker
productivity in the five big industrial nations that revealed
the U.S. workers to be the most productive--12% more
productive than West German workers and 30% more productive
than Japanese workers. [ ~ Although Japan led in productivity
of automobiles and consumer electronics, the rest of its
economy lagged behind, and factory workers in Japan were only
80% as productive as American on an hourly basis. 131
Notwithstanding the need for improvements on both sides of
the Pacific regarding production and quality, the fact remains
that differing perceptions and interests between the United
States and Japan exemplify a basic lack of understanding
between the two competitive yet economically interdependent
cultures. This lack of understanding, combined with distinct
national interests on both sides, led to the controversy
surrounding the development of the FSX aircraft.
17Q Ibid
Alex Dominguez (AP) , "U.S. Workers Most Productive,




Probably the greatest example of technology transfer and
trade related problems between Japan and the United States is
the controversy over the production of Japan's Fighter Support
Experimental (FSX). Japan's original plans were to
indigeneously produce this aircraft, however, pressure from
the U.S. Congress to co-develop this aircraft in order to ease
the trade deficit, followed by subsequent renegotiations (in
favor of the United States) over the exchange of technology
has left a bitter taste in the mouth of many Japanese toward
U.S. -Japan relations. Many Japanese felt that what began as
a national security asset evolved into more of a U.S. -Japan
trade/technology situation, with Japan capitulating to U.S.
demands because of concerns that it may jeopardize its
relationship with the United States. The United States was
seeking the best of both worlds; to lessen its overwhelming
trade deficit, yet provide as little information and
technology as possible in the trade arrangement in order not
to undermine one of its most valued industries.
In 1985 the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) embarked upon a
program to replace its indigeneously produced F-l support
fighter. After numerous considerations, including the
purchase or licensing of foreign aircraft, it was agreed that
since Japan was already dependent on the United States for its
licensed aircraft such as the F-4 and F-15, Japan should seek
self-sufficiency and rely less on the United States by seeking
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domestic production in order further develop its own defense
industry and utilize its indigenous technological advancements
in creating a new aircraft. Government programs were
initiated that would promote such self -reliance . l:i ~
As part of the process of getting funding approval from
the Japanese government, the JDA sought information from three
aircraft companies, including McDonnell Douglas and General
Dynamics, to examine the feasibility of converting already
existing aircraft. When the U.S. Congress became aware of
this, it saw the perfect opportunity to lessen the trade
deficit. Moreover, Japanese indigenous production of a new
aircraft could lead to the birth of a technologically advanced
aerospace industry that could competitively threaten the U.S.
aerospace industry. Therefore, it was recommended by the
U.S. Congress that it would be better to convince Japan to
cancel its indigenous program and instead opt for U.S.
aircraft or a program of joint development. 183
The United States continued to pressure Japan into joint
development, stating that sole Japanese development of the
aircraft would not be cost effective and would compromise
Japan's interoperability with U.S. aircraft. Moreover, it was
believed that sole development by Japan would be perceived by
182 Tai Ming Cheung, "A yen For Arms," Far East Economic
Review , 22 February 1990, 58.
Shinji Otsuki, "The FSX Controversy Revived," Japan
Quarterly 36 (Oct-Dec 1989): 435.
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neighboring countries such as China as operating outside the
framework of the U.S. -Japan Mutual Defense Treaty. 184
Although this was a legitimate argument, the crux of the
argument was the opportunity for the United States to lessen
its trade deficit with Japan.
In March, 1987 the U.S. Department of Defense issued a
formal request to Japan for joint development. Japan
subsequently agreed to establish negotiations with the
Department of Defense regarding technical issues of the
project, however, no formal agreement on joint development was
made .
It is important to point out that while all this was
occurring, the trade problems between both countries were
intensifying. In April the United States levied a 100% tariff
on Japanese microchips in retaliation for Japan dumping on the
U.S. market. A Japanese envoy was sent to Washington to help
resolve the situation, and in a meeting with U.S. senators was
told that the tariff was symbolic, and that Japan's purchase
of U.S. aircraft would serve as a goodwill gesture toward the
continuation of a friendly U.S. -Japan alliance. 18 '
As U.S. pressure continued, Japan's bargaining power
deteriorated considerably when it was revealed that Toshiba
had exported its high-tech propeller milling equipment
184 Ibid., 436.
Masaru Kohno, "Japan's Defense Policy: The FSX
Selection, 1985-1987," Asian Survey (May 1989): 462.
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technology to the Soviet Union. Although the Government of
Japan was not directly responsible, the U.S. sense of betrayal
by Japan brought tensions to a new high. An omnibus trade
bill was introduced in the U.S. Congress in July with a
resolution demanding that Japan purchase U.S. aircraft for the
development of the FSX. Two months later, in a decision based
primarily on preventing further deterioration of the U.S.-
Japan relationship, Prime Minister Nakasone conceded to the
U.S. demands and agreed to the Joint development of its FSX.
General Dynamics' F-16 was chosen as the FSX airframe. What
began as an indigenous project to develop an aerospace
industry and serve Japan's national security interests ended
as a concession to the United States and its own self-serving
interests. The controversy, however, was not over.
As both sides negotiated on how much each side was to
contribute, a disagreement ensued regarding the composite wing
design. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) possessed most of
the technology on the composite design, and felt that they
alone should develop it . General Dynamics was very interested
in this technology, and felt that since it was a joint
project, MHI should share its technology. Eventually a
compromise was agreed to through the formation of a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) whereby "the U.S. side would provide
the Japanese side with all pertinent technological data on the
F-16C, and the Japanese side would provide the U.S. side with
all pertinent data on derived technologies created during the
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development process." 1 Additionally, it was agreed that
the United States would receive 35-40 percent of the
production. The next phase was Congressional approval of the
license and technology agreement. Since both governments had
formally agreed to joint development, and the apparent
difficulties worked out in the MOU, the Japanese government
anticipated little resistance from Congress. This, however,
was not the case. Opposition was mounting in the media and
Congress--inf luenced by the increase of " techno-nat ionalists
"
sentiment in the United States. These " techno-nat ionalists
raised issues regarding the one way bleed of U.S. technology
to Japan, and advocated that tighter controls should be placed
on the export of technological expertise from the United
States. The FSX controversy served as the key issue to fight
over since it was a model for future cooperation in military
technology. 18 ' Most prominent of the " techno-nat ionalists
was Clyde Prestowitz, who argued that:
First it was TV sets, then VCRs , then semiconductors. Now,
unless Congress and the administration act quickly, the
United States will shortly give Japan a big boost toward
its long-sought goal: leadership in aircraft manufacture,
one of the last areas of American high-technology
dominance .... It will transfer technology developed at
great expense to U.S. taxpayers at very low cost to a
country whose primary interest is not defense but catching
13b Otsuki, 438.
187 Nigel Holloway, "Technology Tensions," Far East
Economic Review, 9 March 1989, 15.
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up with America in aircraft and other high-technology
industries . 188
In defense of the joint development, however, former
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci countered with the
following
:
Mr. Prestowitz says that the United States has invested $5
billion to $7 billion in developing and refining the F-16.
That bears no relation to this project, as it includes an
array of technologies that will not be transferred to
Japan under the FSX agreement. He also failed to mention
that the F-16 has been co-produced, to varying extents, in
eight other countries since 1979 .... Similarly , there are
no technological spinoffs from the F-16 that Japan could
apply to the Wide-bodied commercial aircraft industry. 189
The FSX issue continued to intensify in Washington, and
trade and technology issues were at the top of the agenda.
The Office of Trade Representative introduced concerns
regarding trade policy issues, and the Office of Science
Policy expressed its concerns regarding the transfer of
technology. Many critics in Congress were opposed to joint
development, and argued that Japan should purchase off-the-
shelf U.S. fighters to lessen the trade deficit, and
additionally, contribute to Japan's share of the defense
burden . iq °
188 Clyde Prestowitz, "Giving Japan a Handout, " Washington
Post , 29 January 1989, D1,D4.
Frank Carlucci, "The FSX Project is No Handout to
Japan," Washington Post , 9 February 1989.
190 Otsuki, 440
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The Bush administration eventually decided to continue
with joint development, but under further stipulations than
stated in the original MOU . These stipulations included:
restrictions on the computer source code for the F-16's
attitude and weaponry control software; the United States
receive the maximum work share possible; and specific measures
taken to assure Japanese technology derived throughout the
project would be transferred to the United States. 1
The JDA, ASDF, MHI and many Japanese officials reacted to
the American renegotiation with bitterness. After all, it was
the Americans who initially interfered with what was
originally an indigenous Japanese project. Once the United
States pressured Japan into joint development, the Americans
kept changing the rules to meet their needs. The Government
Of Japan had no choice but to continue with the project in
accordance with the new American terms. Budgetary and time
constraints precluded them from reverting to the original
option of sole development. Additionally, failure to
cooperate with the United States could have jeopardized the
relationship, which was already under fire due to the





More important is the reaction in Japan and the damage it
caused to Japanese perceptions of the United States, as
reported in major Japanese newspapers:
From the perspective of the original starting point for
this venture several years ago, when the Defense Agency
sought to develop the craft independently, this is the
worst possible outcome. The ineptitude of Japan's
negotiating tactics, which featured one small concession
after another, has led to an agreement that benefits Japan
but little. . . .The FSX negotiations have shown that we need
to change our view of the United States as the benevolent
"big brother" hovering over the Western alliance. That
image is gone, replaced by that of a country which acts
totally in its own interest. l92
Overturning an intergovernmental agreement because of
domestic political considerations within the United States
cannot help but damage the sense of trust built up over
the years between Japan and the United
States .... Dissatisfaction with the United States is
causing a buildup of stress on the Japanese side, and
concern is mounting over the spread of anti-American
sentiment among the Japanese people. Both the Japanese
and the Americans need to work harder to maintain
harmonious relations. 1 '33
Unfortunately, three years behind schedule and with
exorbitant cost over-runs, the Japanese Defense Agency has
decided to restructure the FSX program into an exercise in R&D
with the development of prototypes only. 1 '114 Some Japanese
: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 1, 1989, as cited in Otsuki
Shinji, "The FSX Problem Resolved?" Japan Quarterly 37 (Jan-
Mar 1990) : 81 .
Mamichi Shimbun, May 2, 1989, as cited in Otsuki
Shinji, "The FSX Problem Resolved?" Japan Quarterly 37 (Jan-
Mar 19 90) : 81.
•
Q4 Phone Conversation between Col. Yoshi Hori, Air
attache, Japanese Embassy, Washington D.C., and the author, 6
November 1992 (AV 1-202-939-6700)
.
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officials blame the Americans for the runaway costs because
they refused to hand over the F-16's "source code"
instructions, which allow greater aircraft maneuverability.
As a result Japanese manufacturers must develop this software
themselves. 1 More realistically the problem is related to
the stock market conditions in Japan, resulting in Japanese
companies having to pay higher real costs for capital . '"
The FSX issue has demonstrated a change in U.S.
perceptions of national security which emphasizes the
importance of trade, industrial competitiveness and technology
transfer. As a result, the firm treatment administered to
Japan has significantly altered their previously strong pro-
American sentiment. Ambiguous actions and mixed signals,
primarily from Congress--coupled with the already existing
trade problems--served to increase the tensions between both
countries and possibly jeopardize the U. S . -Japan relationship.
E. ROLE OF CONGRESS
Kusano Atsuki, who holds a Ph.D. in Sociology and is an
associate professor at the Tokyo Institute of Technology,
maintains that part of the problem has been the self-serving
congressional demands in the United States which have
exacerbated the tensions between both countries. To support
195
"Wings of Desire," The Economist , 24 August 1991, 51
iqb Ibid.
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his argument, he conducted a study which revealed increases in
trade pressure from the United States in odd-numbered years,
which are the off years in the congressional election
calendar. He maintains that during these periods the
legislators are free to devote all their time to looking after
the interests of their constituents. "The trend in overall
pressure and the off-year increments in trade pressure lead
one to suspect that some Congress members, though they may
claim that their demands are provoked by the size of the trade
deficit, are actually using this deficit as an excuse to push
for measures that will serve their constituents'
interests . " 1C" For example, in the case of the FSX, one of
the most outspoken congressmen advocating joint development
was Senator John Danforth of Missouri, where both General
Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas are located. Subsequently,
when it was feared that joint development could jeopardize the
U.S. aerospace industry, Senator Danforth was one of the
primary signatories to a letter to President Bush demanding
that Japan purchase U.S. fighters "off-the-shelf." 1
While conceding that only through external pressure has
Japan opened its markets, and that Japan should seek the
initiative in doing so, Professor Kusano recommends that the
U.S. legislators should coordinate their positions with their
Kusano Atsushi, "U.S. Pressure: Boon or Bane?" Japan
Echo 16, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 61-62.
198 Otsuki, 439-440.
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colleagues, refrain from making direct appeals to Japanese
officials, and refrain as much as possible from making demands
based solely on the narrow interest of their constituents. He
maintains that if the self-serving congressional practices
continue, many Japanese will perceive their efforts at market
liberalization as futile, and that U.S. pressure will continue
no matter what they do. 1 ' Japan cannot be expected to
continually submit to U.S. demands, and in the future, given
the post-Cold War conditions, the leverage the United States
holds vis-a-vis the security arrangement can be expected to
diminish
.
Japan's willingness to stand up to U.S. trade threats was
exemplified in the Spring of 1992. The United States
implemented a change in its trade policy which enables it to
bring lawsuits against anti-competitive business practices by
foreign companies. In response, Japan's MITT was considering
counter-measures which would prohibit Japanese corporations
from complying with U.S. antitrust rulings. - " In another
example one month later, MITI rejected the assertion that
Japan's trade surplus was due to its closed markets, stating
that "Global imbalances are determined by investment, savings
and other structural factors. Bilateral imbalances are rooted
in such factors as industrial structure [and in] fiscal and
199 Atsushi, 65 .
Susumu Awanohara and Sachiko Sakamaki, "Battle by
Statute," Far East Economic Review , 23 April 1992, 54.
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monetary policies."-" Moreover, MITI issued wide ranging
criticisms of the policies of its major trading partners,
specifically criticizing the U.S. preparation of a new Super-
301 trade bill that targeted Japan, claiming the U.S. measures
were contrary to the provisions identified in the GATT. MITI
defines unfair trade "according to internationally accepted
rules, as set out in the GATT and in comparable international
agreements," and contends that within these parameters, the
United States is guilty of employing unfair trade practices in
nine of 10 areas where offenses occur most. 202
In response to U.S. complaints of informal barriers in
Japan which continue to shut out foreign competitors, Japan
readily points out examples of successful foreign firms in
Japan which have demonstrated that these barriers can be
overcome. For example, Coca-Cola maintains over 80 percent of
Japan's cola market; Nestle has garnered 7 percent of the
instant coffee market; Schick controls 70 percent of the razor
market; and from 1986 to 1989 Texas Instruments, Motorola,
Intel, National Semiconductor, and AMD have approximately
doubled their sales in Japan. -'"
All told, these developments call into question the
revisionist argument of adversarial trade. The picture
Anthony Rowley, "Stones Through Glass," Far East





revisionists have painted of Japanese companies earning
monopoly profits in a protected domestic market, on which
the argument of adversarial trade rests, no longer
reflects the dominant reality of the Japanese economy. In
most product areas, Japanese companies face stiff
competition--f rom foreign as well as domestic
producers . J04
F. INDICATIONS OF CHANGE
Despite the distinctiveness of the Japanese as pointed out
in this chapter, there are indications, however, that as the
world becomes more globally linked via economics and trade,
Japan is undergoing a change that is bringing its practices
more into the mainstream. And although external pressure has
been instrumental in "opening up" Japan, too much pressure,
especially during a time of internal change, could be
detrimental to the U.S. -Japan relationship.
As Japan has succeeded in achieving its goal of economic
parity with the industrialized world, there is occurring a
shift that focuses more on the individual and quality of life.
While Japan was struggling to achieve economic success, more
Japanese were willing to work hard and sacrifice immediate
satisfaction, knowing that in the future their efforts would
pay off. As Japan has risen to its current economic status,
the accompanying rise in confidence has allowed the Japanese
to focus more on themselves and their families.
14 Ibid. , 9
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During the period when Japanese were still struggling to
attain fundamental economic well-being, they lacked the
confidence to make individual choices and decisions, and
tended instead to tailor or adapt their behavior to that
of people around them. As they became accustomed to
affluence, however, they gradually gained the self-
assurance to make choices and take action independently.
.
.
Individual taste has become the major preference for
choice, in place of duty, obligation, or conformity- 1 '
There are indications that the strong Japanese work ethic
as discussed earlier in this chapter is lessening its hold on
the Japanese mentality as individuals are beginning to seek
more immediate gratification. In regard to employment,
Japanese are less likely to tolerate hardships and
unfulfilling jobs simply for the sake of security and eventual
promotion. A survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office
in 1983 revealed that 18 percent of Japanese men were
considering switching from their present job into a better
one/ 01 However, by 1987, 42 percent responded in the
affirmative to a similar question.^ 07
The last few years have seen a significant change in the
norms that shaped the traditional Japanese lifestyle.
Technological advances such as multi-media, satellite
communication and facsimile machines; and cultural bridges
such as pop music, student exchange programs and an increase
20? Romberg and Yamamoto, 43
.
Prime Minister's Office, Opinion Survey on Work and
Life
,
(Tokyo, 1984). As cited in Romberg, 45.
Romberg and Yamamoto, 45.
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in Japanese tourists traveling abroad is making life for some
people in Japan as internationally mainstream as any other
industrial country.
Programs are being implemented in Japan that are focusing
more on an improved lifestyle, such as shorter work weeks,
more affordable housing, and a less production-oriented
society more aware of its consumer needs. As Japan has
achieved its economic goals originating in the Meiji era of
catching up with the industrial countries, an awareness of the
economic imbalance is leading to a shift which emphasizes
improving the lifestyles in Japan. This change would call for
less self-sacrifice in the workplace and help to lessen
Japan's excessive trade surplus.
As a result of agreements between Japan and the United
States under the Structural Impediments Initiative, Japan's
Economic Planning Agency has recently published a five year
plan which hopes to fundamentally shift the philosophy of life
and government in Japan. This document identifies specific
objectives designed to improve Japanese lifestyles and bring
Japan more into the world mainstream through implementing
programs such as fewer work hours, increased spending on
public infrastructure and social services, and housing
improvements. 20 ' MITI has asked Japan's producers of
electrical appliances to lengthen their product cycles in an
208 Anthony Rowley, "Kindler, Gentler Japan, " Far East
Economic Review , 9 July 1992, 61.
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effort to reduce the consumption of natural resources and
reduce the working hours; and Toyota has designed its latest
factory with an emphasis on worker comforts. 209
The Economic Planning Agency believes that the Japanese
people are predisposed to, and readily accepting of these
changes. However, they concede that--although they can reduce
the work-hours through legislat ion--it may take some time to
alter the corporate attitudes and philosophies to be less
production-oriented. After all, many of these Japanese
corporations have emerged only through fierce internal
competition where dominance of the market takes priority over
profits. Old habits are hard to break. However, as more and
more individuals adopt a less work-oriented lifestyle, the
corporations that have demonstrated reluctance to change may
have difficulty attracting the younger generation.- This
younger generation in Japan is characterized as a "new breed;"
and their carefree attitudes no longer accept the one-
dimensional values of the older Japanese workers. -1 A shift
toward improved lifestyles would see the "opening up" of Japan
to take advantage of the benefits that foreign goods and
services have to offer. As this change in attitude takes
shape, coupled with the implementation of the above programs,
209
"Couldn't We All Do A Little Bit Worse?" The
Economist , 4 April 1992, 19.
210 Ibid.
211 Romberg and Yamamoto, 46.
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one can expect that Japanese corporations will abandon their
overly aggressive, outdated "catch-up" mentality and settle
into an equilibrium with their competitors. "The inescapable
conclusion is that the legendary Japanese work ethic that
facilitated the country's astounding economic growth is on the
decline. This is a healthy change for the Japanese lifestyle,
even if it comes to mean a drop in productivity."-'-
Moreover, the decrease in productivity could help lessen
Japan's trade surplus with the United States.
Another change that must be taken into consideration is
the relatively declining influence of MITI on Japanese
corporations. Many of Japan's corporations have become
technologically advanced to the point that they no longer
depend on government R&D or licensing of foreign technologies,
and in many cases avoid government sponsored programs if it
requires them to share their technology with their
competitors. Consequently, they are more likely to embark on
their own R&D efforts, or enter into joint ventures with
either domestic or foreign firms of their own choosing. For
example, one sees liaisons between Hitachi and Texas
Instruments on joint microchip development, and technology-
sharing arrangements between Toshiba and Motorola
.
213 This
indicates a diminishing role that MITI can be expected to play
212 Ibid. , 47.
213 Tsurumi, 10.
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in the future. In cases where Japan's government involvement
has hindered foreign imports, this is good. However, where
government involvement is taking measures to lessen the trade
deficit with the United States, the more autonomous industries
could slow this process. Take, for example, computer chips.
The Japanese government was unable to force its companies to
increase their purchase of American chips to the target 20
percent share of the market as established in SII talks. 214
G. OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The historic development of the Japanese mindset helps to
explain some of the current problems between Japan and the
United States. It is important that the United States be
aware of these cultural differences that contribute to the
problems. From a Japanese perspective, their apparent
inability to adapt to the mainstream practices of other
industrialized nations stems from their cultural ambiguities
vis-a-vis their overzealous work ethic and strong sense of
nationalism. Some changes such as the opening of previously
closed markets has only come about through continual external
pressure, exemplifying the positive effect that external
pressure can yield. However, this external pressure has
resulted in tensions between Japan and the United States.
While there is still much to be done regarding the removal of
!14 Tsurumi, 10
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informal barriers, it is important that Japan realize the
positive effects of market liberalization and undertake
efforts on its own initiative."' By doing this, Japan would
be acting in good faith and obviate the need for external
pressure, which would subsequently result in decreased
hostilities. Moreover, the United States must also act in
good faith by taking measures to resolve its internal troubles
which have contributed to the problem, such as decreasing the
federal deficit, and increasing its productivity and quality
of workmanship.
As Japan is showing indications of progress, it is
important that the United States seek to resolve the trade and
technology problems without provoking a Japanese backlash
which could hinder this development and the U.S. -Japan
relationship. Japan has matured into one of the leading world
economic powers, and like any other nation-state, is complete
with its own cultural and national interests as well as
independent national security interests. The United States
undoubtedly played a major role in Japan's emergence into its
current status. Nevertheless, the U.S. -Japan relationship
that existed under the paradigm of the Cold War is now
obsolete. A continuation of aggressive U.S. tactics upon
Japan could lead to a Japan that perceives its relationship
with the United States as more of a liability than an asset,
!15 Atsushi, "U.S. Pressure: Boon or Bane?" 65
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resulting in serious consequences that could undermine the
alliance and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
It is only through a clear, concise understanding of the
factors that have molded the Japanese mindset throughout their
history that we can fully comprehend the current Japanese
attitudes and perceptions. Through this understanding we can
set the foundation to effectively work with Japan in an aura




The trade and technology problems that exist between the
United States and Japan have intensified over the last few
decades . Throughout the Cold War these problems were
superseded by the greater priority assigned to a bilateral
concentration on the Soviet threat posed to both the United
States and Japan. The post-Cold War era, however, has seen a
major attitudinal shift by the United States which now gives
greater priority to economic-related issues and possible
threats to U.S. economic security.
Although the Soviet threat has disappeared with the demise
of the Soviet Union, regional animosities, the high volume of
two-way trade in the region, maintenance of open SLOCs, and
the existence of Communist North Korea call for the
continuance of a U.S. -Japan security arrangement. The future
of the U.S. -Japan relationship will be largely dependent upon
the ability of both countries to successfully resolve the
current problems which collectively serve as a stumbling block
in the path of their relationship. The issues that seem to be
most controversial as of this writing in 1992 are those
related to trade and technology. This thesis has sought to
examine the changing role, and associated frictions, that
trade and technology play in U . S . -Japan relations; and offer
possible recommendations which could diffuse the problems. It
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is imperative that both countries take prompt and cooperative
measures to resolve their differences if they wish to maintain
the mutually favorable relationship.
Japan must realize that its restrictive practices are
inconsistent with those of other trading nations and take
measures to liberalize its markets without continued external
pressure. The rest of the world will only tolerate Japan's
restrictive practices for so long. Fortunately, Japan is
undergoing some internal changes which could help this
process, such as the increase in the number of elderly, and
increasing demand for leisure time which could reduce working
hours
.
The United States, on the other hand, must realize that
many of the trade and technology problems with Japan resulted
from the U.S. post-Occupation willingness to ensure Japan's
economic growth and stability. Japan is not totally
responsible for the current U.S. difficulties. The United
States should continue to pressure Japan to open its markets,
but not to the extent of provoking a backlash of anti-American
sentiment in Japan--especially while Japan is undergoing
internal changes which could reduce its comparative advantages
in international commerce. Moreover, for the overall well-
being of the United States and to diffuse U.S. -Japan
frictions, the United States must take immediate measures to
get its own economic house in order. Balancing the federal
deficit, formulating an industrial policy to ensure survival
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of its vital industries, improving education, and decreasing
the influence of foreign lobbyists in Washington would be
steps in the right direction.
The post-Cold War era is redefining the rules of
international relations. The East-West paradigm that existed
throughout the Cold War is now obsolete. Moreover, the
subordinate role that Japan has played to the United States
must also be revised to reflect the realities of the post-Cold
War era. Regarding the U.S. -Japan relationship, Richard
Holbrooke stated:
The extraordinary size, scope and importance of the
relationship will not only continue; it should increase--
but not on the old basis. Clearly Americans and Japanese
alike should seek to accelerate the day when Japan is
completely freed from the dependency relationship that has
existed in one form or another since 1945. So long as the
United States expects constant repayment for past
generosity and for its open markets, a relationship based
on dependency, resentment and false expectations will
continue. The best basis for post-Cold War relations with
Japan is a mature relationship of equals. The two most
powerful economies in the world, while competitors, must
learn to interact with each other in a manner that sets
aside ideas of junior and senior partnerships. Natural
concepts in the early postwar and Cold War eras, such
notions defied realities of domestic politics in both
countries and were made obsolescent by events in the
communist world and by the Gulf War.- 11,
Given the economic importance of the United States and
Japan to the rest of the world, it is their responsibility as
global leaders to successfully resolve their differences.
This can best be accomplished through cooperative measures
Holbrooke, 54-55
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rather than antagonistic accusations. The resolution of trade
and technology issues will, one way or another, determine the
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